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Error of Law: An Exception to the
Discoverability Principle?
SAMUEL BESWICK*
Under Canadian common law, the limitation principle of discoverability applies to errors
of fact, but not to errors of law. This error-of-law exception is a problematic doctrine. It
appears to resurrect the ostensibly defunct fact/law distinction in civil claims. It stands in
contrast to contemporary English precedent on the discoverability of mistakes of law. It
controverts the Supreme Court of Canada’s claim that discoverability is a “general rule” for
the interpretation of limitation periods on causes of action. And it considerably curtails the
reach of the discoverability principle and the potential for plaintiffs labouring under an error
of law to benefit from an extended limitation period. In practice, the error-of-law exception
may overly curtail rights by protecting those who make legal rules while impeding those
who have been harmed by unjust laws. This article develops a revised understanding of the
error-of-law rule that strikes a better balance between protecting past reliance interests and
vindicating plaintiffs’ rightful positions.
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DISCOVERABILITY IS A FAMILIAR PRINCIPLE in the interpretation of limitation

provisions in Canada. Rather than construing time to run from the date at which
damage or loss occurs, limitation usually runs from when a plaintiff discovered,
or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, their right of action. This
interpretive presumption was cemented into Canadian common law by two
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in the 1980s.1 It has since
been assimilated into the drafting of many limitation statutes at the provincial
and federal level.
While the discoverability principle is well-known, Canadian common law
also recognizes a less familiar exception to the principle in respect of errors of
law. It is encapsulated by a sentence in Graeme Mew’s treatise, which advises
that “[e]rror, ignorance or uncertainty of the law, which may require a potential
claimant to diligently obtain legal or other expertise to interpret the facts,
1.

Kamloops v Nielsen, [1984] 2 SCR 2 at 40-42 [Nielsen]; Central Trust Co v Rafuse, [1986] 2
SCR 147 at 224 [Rafuse].
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does not postpone any limitation period.”2 The effect of this exception is that
limitation periods in Canada are generally not deferred on account of mistake
of law, including misjudgements of legal rights or practice, the overruling of
precedent, and judicial declarations of void or unconstitutional legislation.
A plaintiff’s cause of action in such cases typically arises when they suffer a loss or
damage, not when they discover their error of law.
The error-of-law exception to discoverability is significant. It appears to
resurrect the ostensibly defunct fact/law distinction in civil claims.3 It stands in
contrast to contemporary English precedent on the discoverability of mistakes
of law.4 It controverts the SCC’s claim that discoverability is a “general rule” for
interpreting how limitation runs against causes of action.5 And it considerably
curtails the reach of the discoverability principle and the potential for plaintiffs
labouring under an error of law to benefit from an extended limitation period.
This article seeks to shine a light on this distinct rule of law. It has three
objectives. The first is descriptive. Parts I and II address Canada’s common
law discoverability principle and demonstrate the existence and breadth of the
error-of-law exception in the doctrine. Though the rule has significant import,
it has received only fleeting attention in scholarship to date.
Part III is critical. It contends that, despite its prevalence in case law, Canada’s
exception to the discoverability principle is jurisprudentially shallow. Courts
have often applied it with only brief reasoning, without explaining how the rule
fits Canada’s common law jurisprudence, and without acknowledging the clear
conflict with English precedent.
Part IV is constructive. It sets out a revised understanding of error of law
vis-à-vis the interpretation of limitation provisions. On each side of the Atlantic,
the courts have adopted their own firm rules: In Canada, errors of law are
considered never to defer the running of limitation, whereas in England, they
have been presumed always to postpone the limitation clock. Part IV proposes a
middle path between these two polar positions by reconstructing the Canadian
rule not as an exception to discoverability, but as the presumptive application of
the principle of discoverability. It is for plaintiffs to rebut the presumption that
2.
3.
4.
5.

The Law of Limitations, 3rd ed (LexisNexis, 2016) at para 3.52 [Mew, Limitations].
Cf Air Canada v British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1161 at 1201, La Forest J [Air Canada];
Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd v British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1133 at 1156-57, La Forest
J [Canadian Pacific Air Lines].
See Samuel Beswick, “The Discoverability of Mistakes of Law” [2019] LMCLQ 112
[Beswick, “Discoverability of Mistakes of Law”].
Rafuse, supra note 1 at 224. See Pioneer Corp v Godfrey, 2019 SCC 42 at paras 34-38 [Pioneer
Corp]. Cf Pioneer Corp, ibid at paras 140-50, Côté J, dissenting.
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errors of law are discoverable when they are made. Properly understood, the
Canadian inclination against tethering limitation to the date of some significant
juridical event is sound. This article’s approach to discoverability as it relates to
errors of law rationalizes the Canadian understanding and shows how it might
also guide a re-evaluation of English jurisprudence in this area. It improves the
balance between private interests in vindicating timely legal claims and the
public policies that underlie statutes of limitation, which protect individuals and
government alike.

I. THE INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLE OF DISCOVERABILITY
In broad terms, Canada’s provinces have experienced three waves of statutory
limitation reform.6
A. CONSOLIDATION OF LIMITATION LAWS

Consolidation was the focus of the first wave of reform. In the 1930s, provinces
undertook to amalgamate their diffused limitation provisions into single
limitation statutes.7 This first wave of provincial limitation legislation largely
inherited its drafting language and principles from England.8 The ordinary
limitation period was six years.9 It commenced from when “the cause of action

6.
7.
8.

9.

See Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at paras 1.12-1.47.
See John D Falconbridge, “The Disorder of the Statutes of Limitation” (1943) 21 Can Bar
Rev 669 at 670.
Everett Lane Weaver, Limitations: Being a Treatise on the Time Limit on Actions in Canada,
ed by AE Laverty (Canadian Law List, 1939) at 1; Jeremy S Williams, Limitation of Actions
in Canada, 2nd ed (Butterworth & Co, 1980) at 26; Alberta, Institute of Law Research and
Reform, Limitations, Report for Discussion No 4 (1986) at 12.
See e.g. The Limitations of Actions Act, ULCC 1931, cl 3(1)(j) [Uniform Limitations Act 1931]
in Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Limitation of Actions (1969), Appendix C.
The Uniform Limitations Act 1931 provided a two-year limit for personal injury, defamation,
and certain other actions. See also Weaver, supra note 8, citing Limitations Act, RSO 1937,
c 118 [Ontario, Limitations Act 1937]. The Ontario, Limitations Act 1937 prescribed several
different limitation periods depending on the cause of action.
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arose.”10 The Uniform Limitations Act 1931, which precipitated these reforms,11
provided exceptions in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation,12 concealed fraud,13
and for “actions grounded on accident, mistake or other equitable ground of
relief.”14 In such cases, the ordinary period of limitation ran not from when the
cause of action occurred, but from “discovery” of the action. Ontario15 and British
Columbia16 did not adopt the Uniform Act. Although both provinces recognized
equitable rules that postponed the running of time in some circumstances of
“mistake,” their scope and application came to be considered as “neither clear
nor sufficient.”17
B. DISCOVERABILITY OF CAUSE OF ACTION

The problem of latent or concealed causes of action becoming statute-barred
before a plaintiff could reasonably discover them spurred a second wave of

10. Uniform Limitations Act 1931, supra note 9 at cl 3 (defining an “action” as “any civil
proceeding” at cl 2(a)); Limitations Act, RSO 1960, c 214, s 45; Limitation Act 1939
(E&W), 2 & 3 Geo 6, c 21 (defining an “action” as “any proceeding in a court of law”
at s 31(1)) [Limitation Act 1939 E&W]. See Daniel Zacks, “Claims, Not Causes of
Action: The Misapprehension of Basic Limitations Principles” (2018) 48 Adv Q 165 at
171-72 (“[d]epending on one’s preference, a cause of action completes, accrues, arises,
or ripens. This language all means the same thing: the date on which the cause of action
first becomes viable” at 169, n 12); Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman
Group Ltd (No 2), [1997] 1 WLR 1627 at 1638 (HL Eng), Lord Hoffmann [Nykredit
Mortgage Bank Plc]; Costello v Calgary (City) (1989), 60 DLR (4th) 732 at 741 (Alta CA)
[Costello 1989 Alta CA].
11. Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at para 1.11. The Uniform Limitations Act 1931 was the basis
for the limitation statutes acts enacted in Manitoba (1931), Saskatchewan (1932), Alberta
(1935), Prince Edward Island (1939), the Northwest Territories (1948), New Brunswick
(1952), and Yukon (1954) (ibid).
12. Uniform Limitations Act 1931, supra note 9 at cl 3(1)(g).
13. Ibid, cl 4.
14. Ibid, cl 3(1)(h).
15. Ontario, Limitations Act 1937, supra note 9; Limitations Act, SO 1966, c 214.
16. Statute of Limitations, RSBC 1897, c 123; Statute of Limitations, RSBC 1960, c 370.
17. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Limitation of Action (1969) at 109; Law
Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on Limitations: Project No 6, Report 15
(1974) at 95, citing Law Revision Committee of England and Wales, Fifth Interim Report:
Statutes of Limitation (1936) at 29-32.
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limitation reform in the latter half of the last century.18 As in England,19 provincial
legislatures enacted more expansive discoverability provisions.20 These reforms
largely maintained the principal drafting technique of tethering the running of
the limitation period to the cause of action, but redefined the point at which
the affected action “arises.” For example, Manitoba introduced a discoverability
standard for personal injury claims into its limitation statute in 1967,21 modelled
after the 1963 English legislation,22 and expanded the statutory principle in
198023 following the English Court of Appeal’s watershed judgment five years
earlier in Sparham-Souter v Town & Country (Essex) Ltd.24 Judges, too, came
to reconsider their understanding of limitation provisions. In Sparham-Souter,
a decision concerning latent building defects, the Court of Appeal of England
and Wales set new precedent in holding that a negligence action “does not accrue,
18. Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at paras 1.12-1.50; New Brunswick, Office of the Attorney
General Law Reform Branch, Limitations Act, Discussion Paper (1988) at 4. For a list of
modern English reform reports on limitation, see NH Andrews, “Reform of Limitation of
Actions: The Quest for Sound Policy” (1998) 57 CLJ 589 at 589, n 1. For the position in
the United States, see Calvin W Corman, Limitation of Actions, vol 2 (Little, Brown & Co,
1991) at para 11.2; Ehud Guttel & Michael T Novick, “A New Approach to Old Cases:
Reconsidering Statutes of Limitation” (2004) 54 UTLJ 129 at 136, n 9.
19. See Limitation Act 1963 (E&W), c 47 [Limitations Act 1963 E&W] (replaced by Limitation
Act 1980, c 58, ss 11, 14); UK, Edmund Davies Committee, Limitation of Actions in Cases
of Personal Injury (Cmnd 1829, 1962) (recommending the enactment of the Limitations
Act 1963). See also Latent Damage Act 1986 (E&W), c 37 [Latent Damage Act 1986]; UK,
Law Reform Committee, 24th Report on Latent Damage (Cmnd 9390, 1984) at para 4.4
(recommending the enactment of the Latent Damage Act 1986 and inserting Limitation Act
1980, ss 14A, 14B); Limitation Act 1980 (E&W), c 58, ss 14A-14B.
20. For the most comprehensive early reform, see Limitation Act, SBC 1975, c 37 [Limitation
Act 1975 BC]. The Limitation Act 1975 BC was the first Canadian statute to codify a
general principle of discoverability. Actions governed by these provisions tended also to be
accompanied by shorter headline limitation periods. See Novak v Bond, [1999] 1 SCR 808 at
paras 34, 72, McLachlin J [Novak]; Kent Roach, “Reforming Statutes of Limitations” (2001)
50 UNBLJ 25 at 32 (discussing Novak and considering the “obscure” and “troublesome”
drafting of British Columbia’s discoverability provision).
21. An Act to Amend the Limitation of Actions Act and to amend Certain Provisions of other Acts
relating to Limitations of Actions, SM 1966-67, c 32.
22. Limitation Act 1963 E&W, supra note 19. See AB v Ministry of Defence, [2012] UKSC 9 at
para 165, Lady Hale SCJ.
23. An Act to Amend the Limitation of Actions Act, SM 1980, c 28.
24. [1976] QB 858 (CA) [Sparham-Souter]. See Manitoba Law Reform Commission,
Limitations, (Cameron Harvey, QC) Report 123 (2010) at 15, citing Sparham-Souter
[Manitoba Law Reform, Limitations]. See Harris Wineberg, “British Columbia’s Statutory
Discoverability Rule” (1994) 16 Adv Q 490 at 504-505 (expressing preference for the
common law formulation over British Columbia’s codification).
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and time does not begin to run, until such time as the plaintiff discovers” that
it has suffered “damage, or ought, with reasonable diligence, to have discovered
it.”25 Courts across the Commonwealth took up then-Master of the Rolls Lord
Denning’s novel interpretation of the accrual of negligence actions26 even after
the House of Lords repudiated it less than seven years later.27
Sparham-Souter was assumed to be good law in Canada when the Court of
Appeal for British Columbia ruled in Kamloops v Nielsen that defective building
owners were not time-barred from bringing negligence claims for latent damage
against the City outside of the ordinary limitation period.28 Before a decision on
appeal was rendered,29 Sparham-Souter was overruled in England, and the SCC
was (in the majority’s view) called to resolve an interpretative choice in Nielsen:30
Did the plaintiffs’ cause of action “arise”31 when their building was damaged (in
which case their action would be time-barred) or when the plaintiffs were able to
discover the defects (in which case their action would be timely)? Justice Wilson,
writing for the majority of the Court, endorsed Sparham-Souter: The plaintiffs’
cause of action did not arise, and the limitation period did not commence,
until the defects became reasonably discoverable.32 Whereas the House of
Lords in Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd v Oscar Faber & Partners had found
that “the necessary implication” from the express inclusion of a discoverability
standard in section 26 of the Limitation Act 1939 was that discoverability was
25. Sparham-Souter, supra note 24 at 868. See Andrew McGee & Gary Scanlan, “Imputation
of Facts—Aspects of s 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980” (2001) 20 CJQ 17 at 25;
James C Morton, Limitation of Civil Actions (Carswell, 1988) at 17-18; Janet O’Sullivan,
“Limitation, Latent Damage and Solicitors’ Negligence” (2004) 20 Professional Negligence
218 at 229; Zacks, supra note 10 at 171-72. See also Forster v Outred & Co (1981),
[1982] 1 WLR 86 (CA).
26. See e.g. Invercargill City Council v Hamlin, [1994] 3 NZLR 513 (NZCA), aff’d [1996]
1 NZLR 513 (PC).
27. The House of Lords held that a principle of reasonable discoverability was not to be inferred
into the interpretation of English limitation provisions that did not explicitly incorporate it.
Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd v Oscar Faber & Partners, [1983] 2 AC 1 (HL Eng) [Pirelli].
Parliament responded by enacting the Latent Damage Act 1986, supra note 19. See also Anns
v Merton London Borough Council, [1978] AC 728, Lord Salmon (expressing the view that
the cause of action arose “when the building began to sink and the cracks appeared” at 770).
28. (1981), 129 DLR (3d) 111 at 122-23 (BCCA).
29. Rafuse, supra note 1 at 221; Pirelli, supra note 27. Pirelli was decided after oral submission in
Nielsen, so the SCC called for written submissions on the question. See Nielsen, supra note 1.
30. Nielsen, supra note 1 at 40.
31. Municipal Act, RSBC 1960, c 255, s 738 [Municipal Act 1960 BC]. The one-year limitation
provision in issue was the Municipal Act 1960 BC.
32. Nielsen, supra note 1 at 39-40.
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not to be implied into the statute’s other provisions,33 Justice Wilson in Nielsen
disagreed that the equivalent statutory schemes before her necessarily confined
discoverability to cases of fraud, concealment, and mistake.34 Discoverability
could aid the interpretation of a cause of action’s accrual generally. Justice Wilson
acknowledged the problem of discoverability potentially extending the time for
bringing an action many years after its occurrence.35 But weighed against “the
injustice of a law which statute-bars a claim before the plaintiff is even aware of
its existence,” the interpretative discoverability principle was seen “to be much
the lesser of two evils.”36 Two years later, a unanimous SCC in Central Trust Co
v Rafuse reaffirmed the judgment of the majority in Nielsen as laying down a
“general rule” that “a cause of action arises for purposes of a limitation period
when the material facts on which it is based have been discovered or ought to have
been discovered by the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”37
Over the next decade, despite some resistance,38 discoverability came to be
adopted as a principle of general application to the interpretation of when a
cause of action accrues or arises39 under Canadian limitation statutes.40 The SCC
in Peixeiro v Haberman described the principle as “an interpretive tool … which
ought to be considered each time a limitations provision is in issue.”41 It has,
accordingly, been broadly employed. Discoverability applies where a statute
provides that no action shall be brought beyond X years “after the cause of any
33. Pirelli, supra note 27 at 14-15, citing Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd, [1963] AC 758
(HL Eng) [Cartledge]. See also Pirelli, supra note 27, Lord Fraser (noting that after the
post-Cartledge statutory amendment, “Parliament deliberately left the law unchanged so far
as actions for damages of other sorts was concerned” at 14).
34. Nielsen, supra note 1 at 40.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Rafuse, supra note 1 at 224 [emphasis added]. See Joost Blom, “Concurrent Liability in Tort
and Contract—Start of Limitation Period” (1987) 21 UBC L Rev 429; Nicholas J Mullany,
“Limitations of Actions: Where Are We Now?” [1993] LMCLQ 34 at 39.
38. See Alberta Law Reform Institute, Limitations, Report 55 (1989) at 26-27 [ALRI
Limitations]; Richard W Bauman, “The Discoverability Principle: A Time Bomb in Alberta
Limitations Law” (1993) 1 Health LJ 65 at 79.
39. Zacks, supra note 10 at 169. See Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc, supra note 10 at 1638,
Hoffmann LJ; Costello 1989 Alta CA, supra note 10 at 741.
40. See M(K) v M(H), [1992] 3 SCR 6; Canada (AG) v Lameman, 2008 SCC 14 [Lameman].
See also Graeme Mew, “When Does Time Start to Run? When Does Time Run Out? When
Does the Clock Stop Running?” (2004) 28 Adv Q 448 at 452-53 [Mew, “When Does Time
Start to Run”].
41. [1997] 3 SCR 549 at para 37 [Peixeiro]. For the Supreme Court’s most recent review of the
principle, see Pioneer Corp, supra note 5 at paras 31-42.
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such action arose”42 or “shall have first arisen,”43 or “from the discovery of the cause
of action.”44 Thus, even statutory language that incorporates a knowledge-based
inquiry is construed as complementary with common law discoverability.45
Discoverability also applies when limitation is triggered by an element of an
underlying cause of action, such as where an action must be brought within X
years from when prohibited “conduct was engaged in,”46 or where an action for
the recovery of damages must be brought within X years “from the time when the
damages were sustained,”47 or where an action arising by reason of a deprivation
of land must be brought within X years “from the date when the deprivation took
place.”48 In each case, the interpretation converges on the same construction:
That time does not begin to run until the date of the plaintiff’s discovery or
discoverability of their action.
C. DISCOVERABILITY OF CLAIM

The interpretive discoverability principle did not settle discontent with Canada’s
limitation laws.49 Three problems persisted. First, discoverability exacerbated
inconsistencies in the running of limitation between different causes of action.50
Second, it gave rise to the possibility that “undiscovered” actions could potentially
be indefinitely postponed until such point as a claimant’s cause of action became
42. Rafuse, supra note 1 at 217, citing Statute of Limitations, RSNS 1967, c 168, s 2(1)(e) [Statute
of Limitations 1967]; Costello 1989 Alta CA, supra note 10 at 735, citing Limitation of Actions
Act, RSA 1980, c L-15, s 51(f ) [Limitation of Actions Act 1980].
43. Nielsen, supra note 1 at 40, citing Municipal Act 1960 BC, supra note 31, s 738.
44. Lameman, supra note 40 at para 14, citing Limitation of Actions Act 1980, supra note 41,
s 4(1)(e)). See Uniform Limitations Act 1931, cl 3(1)(h).
45. Nielsen, supra note 1 at 42; Novak, supra note 20 at para 10.
46. Pioneer Corp, supra note 5 at paras 43-44, citing Competition Act, RSC 1985,
c C-34, s 36(4)(a)(i).
47. Hope v RM of Parkdale #498, 2013 SKPC 176 at para 59, citing The Municipalities Act,
SS 2005, c M36.1, s 344(1)); Peixeiro, supra note 41 at para 11, citing Highway Traffic Act,
RSO 1990, c H-8, s 206(1).
48. Hill v South Alberta Land Registration District (1993), 100 DLR (4th) 331 at 337 (Alta CA)
[Hill v Alberta Alta CA]; McWhorter v Alberta (North Alberta Land Registration District),
[1988] 3 WWR 132 at para 18 (Alta QB) (CanLII) [McWhorter Alta QB], aff’d on other
grounds [1989] 5 WWR 183 (Alta CA) [McWhorter CA]. Both considering s 168(1)(a) of
the Land Titles Act 1980. See Land Titles Act, RSA 1980, c L-5, s 168(1)(a). See also Fleming
v Hanna, (1994) 124 Nfld & PEIR 30 (NL SC) (considering The Medical Act, 1974, Stats
Nfld No 119, s 25A.A, as amended by 1975, No 13, s 2; Hospitals Act, 1971, SN 1971,
No 81, s 37, as amended by 1973, No 118 and 1983, c 49, s 1).
49. Zacks, supra note 10 at 170; Roach, supra note 20 at 40. See Guttel & Novick, supra note 18
at 179 (providing an economic analysis and critique of contemporary limitation law).
50. See Blom, supra note 37 at 438-439, 443-448; Zacks, supra note 10 at 182.
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reasonably discoverable.51 Except where longstop provisions52 or the equitable
doctrine of laches applied,53 courts would not infer an outer limit on when a
claim could be brought. The potential for claims to lie dormant for decades
undermined core principles of certainty and finality.54 Third, discoverability could
also, counterintuitively, lead to actions expiring before a claim could feasibly
be brought. It has, for instance, been a “primary stumbling block” to litigating
claims concerning historic sexual abuse.55
In response, a third wave of limitation reform has spread to supersede
the old law. The modern Limitation of Actions Acts abandon the framework of
cause-of-action accrual.56 In these Acts, it is the “claim,”57 not the particular “cause
of action,” that determines the running of limitation. Cause of action and claim
are not synonymous. The former is a precondition of the latter,58 but one only
has a claim once one can plead a right to a remedy. Under the modern drafting,
limitation commences once it is discoverable both that a claimant had a claim and
that civil proceedings over it were “warrant[ed]” or “appropriate.”59 The right to
51. Bauman, supra note 38 at 79; Mullany, supra note 37 at 48.
52. See Roach, supra note 20 at 26, 42, 44-46.
53. See Bauman, supra note 38 at 80-82; Francis A Anglin, Limitations of Actions Against Trustees
(Canada Law Book Company, 1900) at 9-10.
54. See generally Jeremy Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice” (1992) 103 Ethics 4; Arthur
Ripstein, “The Rule of Law and Time’s Arrow” in Lisa M Austin & Dennis Klimchuk, eds,
Private Law and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 306.
55. Graeme Mew & Adrian Lomaga, “Abusive Limits: M(K) v M(H) and a Comparison of the
Limitation for Sexual Assault” (2009) 35 Adv Q 133 at 134. See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey &
Freya Kodar, “Improving the Potential of Tort Law for Redressing Historical Abuse Claims:
The Need for a Contextualized Approach to the Limitation Defence” (2010) 42 Ottawa
L Rev 95 at 117.
56. Such statutes have been enacted in Alberta (1996), Ontario (2002), Saskatchewan (2004),
New Brunswick (2009), British Columbia (2012), and Nova Scotia (2014). The Manitoba
Law Reform Commission proposed reforms, which have not been enacted. See The
Manitoba Law Reform, Limitations, supra note 24; Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at para
3.66; Pioneer Corp, supra note 5 at para 32.
57. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Limitations Act (2005) (establishing that
“‘claim’ means a claim to remedy an injury, loss or damage that occurred as a result of an act
or omission,” cl 1).
58. Zacks, supra note 10 at 182.
59. See Limitations Act, RSA 2000, c L-12, s 3(1)(a)(iii) [Alberta Limitations Act]; Uniform
Limitations Act (2005), s 5(a)(iv); Limitations Act, SO 2002, c 24, s 5(1)(a)(iv). See also
Manitoba Law Reform, Limitations, supra note 24 at 21 (“This provision, in its different
forms, is intended to recognize that the nature or extent of the injury or damage suffered may
not be immediately apparent, and to avoid forcing plaintiffs into litigating unnecessarily over
minor damage in order to preserve their rights.”).
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sue is further constrained by default ultimate limitation periods that apply across
the board, subject to prescribed exceptions and extensions.60 For provinces that
have modernized their limitation statutes, this third wave of limitation reform
marks a break from English limitation law. It also hails a departure from Canada’s
traditional understanding of the judge-made discoverability principle,61 since
the statutory discoverability provisions take precedence. Courts nevertheless
frequently refer back to the interpretive principle in construing modern
limitation statutes.62
D. DISCOVERABILITY TODAY

Despite the contemporary trend in Canada’s provinces toward the statutory
“claim”-based framework, common law discoverability remains an important
interpretive rule for several reasons. First, the third-wave reforms are best
understood as an improvement on, not a clean break with, what came before.
Second, not all provinces have abandoned the “cause of action” framework.63
Second-wave reform drafting also subsists in key federal limitation statutes,64

60. Zacks, supra note 10 at 183-84. See Apotex Inc v Nordion (Canada) Inc, 2019
ONCA 23 at para 86.
61. Zacks, supra note 10 at 165. See Rooplal v Fodor, 2019 ONSC 7211 at para 5 (holding
that the discoverability provisions in the Limitations Act, SO 2002, c 24, oust common law
discoverability in Ontario).
62. Mew does not draw as sharp a distinction with past limitation regimes as Zacks does.
See Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at paras 3.66, 3.121; Mew, “When Does Time Start
to Run,” supra note 40. See also HOOPP Realty Inc v Emery Jamieson LLP, 2018 ABQB
276 at paras 174-220 [HOOPP Realty]; Ambrozic v Burcevski, 2006 ABQB 4 at paras
29-32, 59 [Ambrozic]; Waap v Alberta, 2008 ABQB 544 at paras 123-126 [Wapp]; Stewart
Estate v TAQA North Ltd, 2013 ABQB 691 at para 197 [Stewart Estate]; Miller v Canada,
2018 FC 599 at paras 91-100 [Miller]; Pecharsky v Pecharsky, 2019 ABQB 219 at paras
90-99 [Pecharsky]; New Brunswick v Thornton, 2020 NBCA 18 at para 92; Equinav
Financial Corporation v Roesslein Estate, 2020 SKCA 69 at para 25. For a summary of the
legal principles guiding the interpretation of limitation periods, see Condominium Plan
No 0625385 v Oxford Grande Ltd, 2017 ABQB 316 at para 20 [Condominium Plan No
0625385]. See also Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at paras 3.48-3.53.
63. The limitation statutes of Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island,
Yukon, and the Northwest Territories are still largely influenced by the traditional English
drafting and the Uniform Limitations Act 1931.
64. A fallback limitation period that requires proceedings to be brought “within six years after
the cause of action arose” is prescribed by two federal acts. See Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985,
c F-7, s 39(2); Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50, s 32.

306

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

as well as hundreds of particular provincial and federal limitation provisions.65
Those statutes remain subject to common law discoverability, as do actions that
arose prior to the modern reforms.66
Canada’s common law understanding of discoverability may also usefully
inform the interpretation of limitation provisions in other jurisdictions.67
Most pertinently, it can aid judicial understanding of the English statutory
developments that Canada’s second-wave reforms mirrored. When the House
of Lords in Pirelli declined to infer a general principle of discoverability into the
interpretation of the English Limitation Act 1939, it constrained considerations
of discoverability to those provisions in which Parliament specifically provided
for it.68 This conservative approach to statutory interpretation has seemingly
dissuaded English judges from looking to the interpretive understandings
of analogous provisions abroad. Yet, the statutory provision in the Limitation
Act 1980 E&W—that limitation on an action based on fraud, concealment,
or mistake “shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud,
concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence
have discovered it”69—is clearly paralleled in Canadian limitation statutes and in
the interpretative principle of discoverability.70 Indeed, it was English legislation
and cases that provided “the source for the development of the Canadian rule.”71
Canada’s understanding of discoverability can, in the relevant contexts, usefully
inform the adjudicative approach in England and elsewhere.72

65. See e.g. Marine Liability Act, SC 2001, c 6, s 14(1); Bank Act, SC 1991, c 46, s 272(3);
Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34, s 36(4)(a)(i). See Mew, Limitations, supra note 2
at Appendix B, C.
66. See Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at paras 1.73-1.86.
67. Christine French, “Time and the Blamelessly Ignorant Plaintiff: A Review of the Reasonable
Discoverability Doctrine and Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1950” (1998) 9 Otago L
Rev 255 at 262-63.
68. See Pirelli, supra note 27 at 10, 14.
69. Limitation Act 1980 (E&W), s 32(1) [Limitation Act 1980 E&W] [emphasis added].
70. Rafuse, supra note 1 at 224. See Erik S Knutsen, “Limitation Periods and the Symbiosis of
Capacity and Discoverability” (2003) 237 Ann Rev Civ Litig 237 at 241.
71. See Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at para 3.29.
72. Andrews, supra note 18 at 593, citing Limitation Act 1980 E&W, supra note 69 (noting that
s 32(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 E&W is “important if ‘discoverability’ does not become
the general ‘starting-date’ test” in England (ibid at 593, n 18)); Law Reform Commission
of Ireland, Limitation of Actions, Report 104 (2011) (noting that modern limitation regimes
“owe much to the pioneering work in the 1980s in Canada of the Alberta Institute of Law
Research and Reform” (at 28)).
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II. THE EXCEPTION: ERROR OF LAW
The divergence in approaches to the law of limitation in Canada and England—
the contrast between Nielsen and Pirelli—likely accounts for why jurists have not
previously ventured to compare the relationship between the laws of limitation
and mistake across these respective jurisdictions. That is unfortunate. While
claims in restitution for mistake of law have proliferated in England owing to the
perceived advantage that the discoverability provision in the English Limitation
Act allows,73 equivalent pleadings in Canada have been constrained specifically
by reference to the discoverability principle. The two jurisdictions adopted
polar opposite positions when it came to the discoverability of mistakes of law.
Important jurisprudential insights emerge from both sides of the Atlantic.
Owing to Canada’s federal structure and its entrenched Constitution, the
resolution of errors as to the law has been a more familiar feature of the judicial
role in Canada than in England. In working through arguments testing the
scope of discoverability, Canadian courts have honed a significant caveat to the
principle. This was succinctly stated in Hill v Alberta: “Discoverability refers to
facts, not law. Error or ignorance of the law, or uncertainty of the law, does not
postpone any limitation period.”74
Whereas in England the courts had (until very recently) come to hold that a
mistake as to a point of law is discoverable “when the point has been authoritatively
resolved by a final court,”75 in Canada the running of limitation on actions arising
from a mistake of law is explicitly not postponed by discoverability. At first blush
this seems counterintuitive. In developing the discoverability principle, Canadian
jurisprudence appeared to embrace a comparatively liberal understanding of
limitation provisions. Yet the courts adhere to a conservative stance in cases of

73. Charles Mitchell, “End of the Road for the Overpaid Tax Litigation?” (2017-18) 9
UKSC YB 1 at 7.
74. Supra note 48 at 336.
75. Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Commissioners of Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [2016] EWCA Civ 1180 at para 372 [FII Test Claimants
v HMRC (CA)], applying Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue, [2006]
UKHL 49 [Deutsche Morgan Grenfell]. See Steven Elliott, Birke Häcker & Charles Mitchell,
“Introduction” in Steven Elliott, Birke Häcker & Charles Mitchell, eds, Restitution of
Overpaid Tax (Hart, 2013) at 4. The UK Supreme Court recently abandoned this precedent
and overruled Deutsche Morgan Grenfell in Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income
Group Litigation v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2020] UKSC 47
[FII Test Claimants v HMRC (SC)].
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mistake of law. In such cases, error or mistake76 does not postpone a limitation
period. This is despite the fact/law distinction in restitutionary actions having
been eschewed by the SCC,77 and despite discoverability being a principle
of general application.78 English courts, meanwhile, seem to have pursued
a conservative interpretive position on discoverability generally—declining
to imply the principle into the words of the Limitation Act—while liberally
embracing the principle in the one type of action where Canadian jurisprudence
explicitly excludes it. Indeed, it was only one year after the SCC had affirmed
discoverability as a “general rule” of interpretation79 that this exception to the
principle was recognized in a case arising from void legislation.80
Canada’s error-of-law exception is frequently applied in the jurisprudence,
but has been fleetingly acknowledged in the scholarship.81 The discussion that
follows unpacks the Canadian rule. For succinctness, the discussion focuses on
cases arising out of the province of Alberta, though the rule has been endorsed
across Canada’s common law provinces.82 Alberta’s Limitation of Actions Act 1980
76. These terms are synonymous. Thus, the “mistake of law” rule in Bilbie is known in other
jurisdictions as an “error of law” rule. See Bilbie v Lumley, (1802) 2 East 469 [Bilbie]. See
Scottish Law Commission, Judicial Abolition of the Error of Law Rule and its Aftermath,
(Discussion Paper 99) (Scottish Law Commission, February 1996); Helen Silving, “The
Unknown and the Unknowable in Law” (1947) 35 Cal L Rev 352 at 362. See also Salna v
Awad, 2011 ABCA 20 at para 28 [Salna v Awad Alta CA].
77. Air Canada, supra note 3 at 1201, La Forest J; Canadian Pacific Air Lines, supra note 3 at
1156, La Forest J.
78. Rafuse, supra note 1 at 224.
79. Ibid.
80. Costello v Calgary (City) (1987), [1988] 1 WWR 379 (Alta QB) [Costello 1987 Alta QB].
81. Cf Lionel Smith, “The Timing of Injustice” in David Dyzenhaus & Mayo Moran, eds,
Calling Power to Account: Law, Reparations, and the Chinese Canadian Head Tax Case
(University of Toronto Press, 2005) at 299.
82. Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at para 3.52, n 78. See also Tucker v Fortune Financial Corp,
(11 March 2003) Ontario 00-GD-48868, 00-GD-48870 (Ont Sup Ct) at 16 [Tucker];
Milbury v Nova Scotia, 2007 NSCA 52 at para 27 [Milbury]; Laite v Younge, 2016 NWTSC
42 at para 20 [Laite]; Templanza v Wolfman, 2016 ABCA 1 at para 19 [Templanza]; Lorencz
v Talukdar, 2017 SKQB 389 at paras 27-28, 34 [Lorencz]; Goyetche et al v International
Union of Operating Engineers et al, 2019 NBCA 16 at para 40 [Goyetche]. Cf Rarie v Maxwell
(1998), 168 DLR (4th) 579 [Rarie]; Beaudoin et al v Conley, 2000 MBCA 83 at para 63
[Beaudoin]. The Alberta Court of Appeal initially resisted the introduction of the Nielsen
and Rafuse discoverability principle, but it ultimately came to be afforded broad application.
A discoverability principle was codified in the Alberta Limitations Act. See Costigan v Ruzicka
(1984), 13 DLR (4th) 368 (Alta CA); 98956 Investments Ltd (Receiver of ) v Fidelity Trust
Co (1987), 89 AR 151 at para 28 (CA) (CanLII); ALRI Limitations, supra note 38 at 26-27;
Roach, supra note 20 at 40-41; Alberta Limitations Act, supra note 59, s 3(1)(a).
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treated “actions grounded on … mistake” in a materially similar way to the English
Limitation Act 1980.83 Yet, it was Albertan precedent that first determined that
the principle of discoverability could not serve to postpone limitation in cases
of “mistake” as to the law. This common law exception endures under Canada’s
reformed provincial limitations legislation.84 So it remains important that it is
properly understood.
A. DISCOVERABILITY AND MISTAKE: COSTELLO, MCWHORTER, AND HILL

Canada’s discoverability exception edged into common law understanding
through three cases stemming from the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta. Each
case had a similar trajectory: an initial transaction, followed by litigation leading
to a judgment exposing a flaw in the legal basis for the transaction, followed by an
application to the court (in light of the judgment) to rectify the situation outside
of the ordinary period of limitation. Appreciation of the factual circumstances
elucidates the courts’ rationale for developing the rule.
The first case to hold that discoverability does not extend time for errors of
law was Costello v Calgary (City).85 This was a damages claim filed against the
City of Calgary after the plaintiffs successfully challenged a 1972 by-law that
provided for expropriation of their property.86 The City had taken possession of
the plaintiffs’ motel and land in 1974. In 1976, the plaintiffs sought a declaration
that the by-law was void. Though their public law challenge initially failed at
trial87 and before the Court of Appeal of Alberta,88 it succeeded before the
SCC, which declared the City’s by-law void ab initio and ordered the return
of the plaintiffs’ property.89 Two years after the SCC’s judgment, the plaintiffs
83. Limitation of Actions Act 1980, supra note 42. Although s 4(1)(e) of the Limitation of Actions
Act 1980 expressly referred only to a subjective inquiry (into when the claimant discovered
the cause of action), by operation of the interpretive principle of discoverability time would
not begin to run on actions grounded on mistake until the plaintiff discovered, or could with
reasonable diligence have discovered, the cause of action. See Limitation Act 1980 E&W, supra
note 69, s 32(1)(c) (mirroring s 4(1)(e) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1980).
84. HOOPP Realty, supra note 62 at paras 174-220; Ambrozic, supra note 62 at paras 29-32, 59;
Waap, supra note 62 at paras 123-26; Stewart Estate, supra note 62 at para 197; Miller, supra
note 62 at paras 91-100; Pecharsky, supra note 62 at paras 90-99. For summarized principles,
see Condominium Plan No 0625385, supra note 62 at para 20. See also Mew, Limitations,
supra note 2 at paras 3.48-3.53.
85. See supra note 80.
86. See Bauman, supra note 38 at 74-75.
87. Costello v Calgary (City) (1980), 109 DLR (3d) 723 at 729 (Alta QB).
88. See Costello et al v City of Calgary (1981), 123 DLR (3d) 256 (Alta CA).
89. Costello and Dickhoff v City of Calgary, [1983] 1 SCR 14.
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issued proceedings against the City in trespass and wrongful taking, claiming
$10 million in damages.
In these proceedings, Justice Virtue accepted that discoverability extended
to claims in trespass.90 But he rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the SCC’s
judgment in 1983 gave rise to their damages action. The judgment was declaratory
of the plaintiffs’ rights; it did not create them. It was not, then, a materially
significant event for discerning when the plaintiffs could have “discovered” their
grievance against the City.91 The material facts that had supported the initial
action for declaratory relief “would also have supported an action for damages.”92
Accordingly, despite having failed before the lower courts, the plaintiffs were
considered capable of discovering their damages action at the outset. Justice
Virtue stated, “A claimant does not have to find out from a court by a declaratory
judgment his position as to liability in order to be in possession of the material
facts upon which a claim for damages can be commenced.”93 It was therefore
the date of the expropriation—not the date of the SCC’s determination of the
plaintiffs’ rights—from which time under the Limitation of Actions Act started to
run. It was at that point that the plaintiffs had the material facts needed to assert
their public law action. It was the same for their private law action. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs’ claim ought to have been filed by 1976 at the latest—that is, within
two years of the unlawful expropriation94—and it was, by 1985, well out of time.95
Justice Virtue’s reasons in Costello were subsequently endorsed in McWhorter
v Alberta,96 a case in which Justice Andrekson broadened the discoverability
principle’s reach. McWhorter arose from an error in the transfer of land to
a municipal district under tax recovery proceedings in 1943. The Registrar
of Land Titles had mistakenly included subsurface mines and minerals in the
new certificate of title—the rights to which ought to have remained with the
original owner, Meyers. The property was sold in 1946 to a private purchaser,
Krautt, without noting the reservation on mines and minerals. The following
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Costello 1987 Alta QB, supra note 80, citing Nielsen, supra note 1; Rafuse, supra note 1.
Rafuse, supra note 1 at 224.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Limitation of Actions Act 1980, supra note 42, s 51(f ).
On further appeal, that latter finding was overturned, for reasons unconnected to
discoverability, though Justice Virtue’s reasons were not directly disturbed. See Costello
1989 Alta CA, supra note 10, leave to appeal to SCC refused, (1990) 65 DLR (4th) viii
(25 January 1990).
96. McWhorter Alta QB, supra note 48 at para 24 (CanLII). See Hill v Alberta Alta CA, supra
note 48 at 338.
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year, the registrar purported to “correct” the error by amending Krautt’s title
and issuing Meyers a new certificate of title; but three-and-a-half decades later,
on the application of Krautt’s estate, the Court of Appeal of Alberta held that
this “correction” had been ultra vires the registrar’s powers and was of no effect.97
As a result, in 1981, the registrar cancelled the Meyers certificate of title and
issued a new certificate in favour of Krautt’s estate. The beneficiaries of Meyers’
title then filed against the Alberta Land Titles Assurance Fund, contending that
the registrar’s mistakes had deprived them of their property interest. Was their
claim statute-barred, or had it been brought “within six years from the date when
the deprivation took place”?98 In a new round of litigation, Justice Andrekson
extended discoverability to actions under the Land Titles Act.99 But he rejected the
plaintiffs’ contention that the Court of Appeal’s judgment in 1980 had materially
affected their legal position vis-à-vis the Registrar of Land Titles. Citing Costello,
Justice Andrekson averred:100
The judgment of our Court of Appeal in Krautt v Paine supra was not, in my view, a
“material fact on which the plaintiffs’ case is based”; rather, it was a determination of
law. In my view the plaintiffs would have had full notice of deprivation when they
were in possession of all of the relevant facts upon which the Court of Appeal made
its determination in Krautt supra.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal sidestepped the first issue101 but agreed
that, regardless, it was the registrar’s error in 1943—not the court’s order in
1980—that had deprived the plaintiffs of their rights.102 The evidence indicated
that this error (and the plaintiffs’ cause of action) could have been discovered

97. Krautt’s estate had contended that Krautt had been a bona fide purchaser for value of the
entire parcel of land, and issued proceedings seeking a declaration that the estate owned the
mines and minerals. See Krautt v Paine, [1980] 6 WWR 717.
98. Land Titles Act, RSA 1942, c 205, s 167(a).
99. McWhorter Alta QB, supra note 48 at paras 15-19 (CanLII). Cf Nicholas Rafferty,
“McWhorter v Reg., North Alta. Land Registration Dist.,” Case Comment, (1988) 57 Alta
LR (2d) 335.
100. McWhorter Alta QB, supra note 48 at para 23 (CanLII).
101. McWhorter CA, supra note 48 (“we are not agreeing or disagreeing with the learned chambers
judge when he found a discoverability rule inside the limitation period” at 5).
102. Ibid at 3-4.

312

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

at the latest by 1973,103 when the registrar—identifying the potential error—
had registered a caveat on the certificate of title. The plaintiffs’ action, issued in
1984, was time-barred for that reason. Though the Court of Appeal of Alberta
affirmed this outcome, it acknowledged the unfairness that limitation provisions
can yield even applying discoverability. The solution, though, lay not in creative
adjudication. While the plaintiff had no enforceable right, the court considered it
“a proper case for the Government to consider an ex gratia payment.”104
The Court of Appeal of Alberta sought to settle the law in Hill v Alberta.105
Mr. Hill had, in 1977, procured a mortgage over his wife’s property without her
knowledge or consent. Mrs. Hill uncovered details of the mortgage in 1981 and
complained to the Law Society but did not immediately challenge the mortgage.
She made no payments on it. In 1982 the new mortgagee commenced foreclosure
proceedings. Mrs. Hill successfully resisted foreclosure before the Court of
Queen’s Bench of Alberta,106 but she lost on appeal,107 and in 1987 a foreclosure
order was issued, followed by an order of eviction.108 Having lost her case and
her home, Mrs. Hill filed against the Land Titles Assurance Fund in 1988.109
The question again arose: When was it that “the deprivation took place” for the
purpose of the governing six year limitation period?110 Mrs. Hill contended that
the court’s eviction order had deprived her of her interest in the property. The
Court of Appeal of Alberta disagreed. Justice Côté held: “In 1987 the Court of
Appeal only determined the law and did not create anything, and its judgment
was not a fact …. The judgment was not a fact needed for a cause of action, nor
a fact needing discovery (if discoverability applies).”111 The court’s judgment had
“only confirm[ed] what has existed all along”—that the mortgage over Mrs. Hill’s
103. On the evidence it was not clear whether the registrar’s purported “correction” of the
certificates of title in 1946 should have alerted Meyers to the mistaken transfer. But following
the transfer to Meyers’s beneficiary, there was evidence that the beneficiary’s solicitor had
notice of a potential “‘tax transfer’ error,” and in any event Justice Andrekson was satisfied
that the deprivation was discoverable when the registrar filed a registrar’s caveat on notice in
1973. See McWhorter Alta QB, supra note 48 at paras 30-34 (CanLII).
104. McWhorter CA, supra note 48 at 5.
105. Hill v Alberta CA, supra note 46, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1994] 1 SCR viii (10
February 1994).
106. Paramount Life Insurance Company v Hill, [1985] 6 WWR 340 at para 87 (AltaB QB)
(CanLII) (declaring the mortgage null and void).
107. Paramount Life Insurance Company v Hill (1986), 34 DLR (4th) 150 (Alta CA).
108. Hill v Alberta CA, supra note 48 at 332-35 (summarizing the factual history).
109. Hill v South Alberta Land Registration District, [1991] 5 WWR 448 (CanLII) (Alta QB).
110. Ibid at para 7, referencing Land Titles Act, RSA 1980, c L-5, s 168(1)(a).
111. Hill v Alberta CA, supra note 48 at 338.
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property was valid.112 It was the registration of that mortgage that had deprived
her of an interest in her property. As Mrs. Hill had discovered the mortgage more
than six years before she claimed against the Assurance Fund, she was time-barred.
The scope of the discoverability principle was thus stated to encompass “facts, not
law,” nor “[e]rror or ignorance of law, or uncertainty of the law.”113 This principle
has since been endorsed and affirmed across Canada’s provinces.114
B. THE DECLARATORY THEORY OF ADJUDICATION

Woven throughout these cases is the idea that judicial determinations on points
of law do not affect the interpretation of limitation statutes. In each case, the
judges drew a distinction between discovering the “material facts” upon which
the claim was based and discovering the law by which those facts grounded a right
of action. Whereas the courts accepted that certain facts would be undiscoverable
until some material event had occurred (e.g., Mrs. Hill uncovering the fraudulent
mortgage),115 the law was not understood in this way. The disputed points of
law were, rather, characterized as background to the events that gave rise to the
claims. It was the factual events that were material. Whether or not the plaintiff
understood the legal implications of the facts did not bear on the question of
whether the cause of action had arisen.116 So, on this approach, it could not bear
on the running of limitation. As it is the law that informs one’s understanding
of legal implications, judicial elaborations of the law, it seems, manifestly are not
relevant to the limitation inquiry.
The legal philosophy that underpins this idea is the declaratory theory of
adjudication. This philosophy, Chief Justice Bayda opined in Re Edward, “has
become so elementary that most courts now readily apply it without making
reference to it and perhaps without even recognizing that they are using it.”117
It is evoked in the references in Hill to the Court of Appeal of Alberta’s judgments
as having “declared” or “confirm[ed]” or “determined the law,” rather than having
112. Ibid at 338-39.
113. Ibid at 336.
114. Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at para 3.52, n 78. See also Tucker, supra note 82 at 16;
Milbury, supra note 82 at para 27; Laite, supra note 82 at para 20; Templanza, supra note
82 at para 19; Lorencz, supra note 82 at paras 27-28, 34; Goyetche, supra note 82 at para 40.
Cf Rarie, supra note 82; Beaudoin, supra note 82 at para 63.
115. Hill v Alberta CA, supra note 48.
116. Ibid (stating “I can lose my ownership but once. It is not lost anew when the courts note the
fact” at 338-39).
117. Edward v Edward Estate (1987), 39 DLR (4th) 654 at 661 (Sask CA) [Re Edward]. See
Fleming v Hanna (1994), 124 Nfld & PEIR 30.
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“create[d] anything.”118 William Blackstone solemnized the declaratory theory
as a basic feature of common law adjudication that differentiates the judicial
role from the legislative.119 Whereas Parliament legislates prospectively, courts
are constrained to interpret the law consistently across cases. Because the nature
of adjudication is backward-looking—articulating what the law was in each
case that comes before the court—a judge’s rulings are generally understood to
elucidate what already was. Judicial decisions can thus be seen to operate both
prospectively and retrospectively.120 They are prospective in that a judgment serves
as precedent for resolving future issues. They are retrospective because they clarify
with hindsight the law that governed parties’ interactions. Canada’s error-of-law
rule, being premised on the idea that judicial adjudication does not “change” the
law, assumes that a judgment elucidating a plaintiff’s error on a point of law does
not give rise to any new condition that might require “discovering.” It does not
give rise to a change in the plaintiff’s circumstances in the way that the finding of
a fraudulent mortgage document does.
Despite fervent critiques of the “Blackstonian theory,”121 the principle prevails
through Canada’s error-of-law exception. The exception is of broad application.
It has been applied in cases where a plaintiff has held a mistaken understanding
of the law—namely, when the plaintiff was ignorant as to the governing legal
authorities and principles, or misjudged their relevance. It has similarly been
applied in cases where the law itself was in error—that is, where a principle of law
has been overruled or a legislative provision declared void and of no legal effect.
This is readily demonstrable in the case law.
C. MISTAKEN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW

McWhorter and Hill both concerned mistaken understandings of the law. They are
examples of legal misjudgement. For a period of time, the plaintiffs believed that
they owned title to property without the defendants’ encumbrance. By this they
118. Hill v Alberta CA, supra note 48 at 336, 338-39.
119. Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 1 (Clarendon Press, 1765) at 69-70. See Munster v
Lamb (1883), LR 11 QBD 588 (CA), Brett MR.
120. Re Edward, supra note 117 at 661; Canada (AG) v Hislop, 2007 SCC 10 at para 83 [Canada
v Hislop]. See Samuel Beswick, “Retroactive Adjudication” (2020) 130 Yale LJ 276 [Beswick,
“Retroactive Adjudication”].
121. See e.g. Lord Reid, “The Judge as Law Maker” (1972) 12 J Soc Pub Teachers L 22; Aruna
Nair, “‘Mistakes of Law’ and Legal Reasoning: Interpreting Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln
City Council” in Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell & James Penner, eds, Philosophical
Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, 2009) 373 at 390-91.
See Canada v Hislop, supra note 120 at para 93.
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laboured under a mistake of fact, since the properties were in fact encumbered by
the defendants’ proprietary claims. Even after the defendants’ rival claims came
to light, the plaintiffs continued to believe that the law gave their own claims
precedence. That they were mistaken in their understanding of the law, and in
its application to their circumstances, was ultimately confirmed by the Court of
Appeal of Alberta’s judgments. On the declaratory view, the court’s judgments did
not remove any right of the plaintiffs over the properties; they merely confirmed
that the plaintiffs had no right to assert, and that the plaintiffs had been mistaken
for thinking otherwise.
This precedent has not been confined to discoverability as a principle of
common law, nor limited to cases concerning proprietary claims. It has been
invoked in actions arising in the law of tort, breach of contract, statutory duty,
and unjust enrichment. Less than a year after Hill was decided, the Court of
Appeal of Alberta applied it to a dispute of a kind that, in England,122 became the
quintessential impetus for the extension of limitation: A claim for restitution of
mistakenly overpaid taxes.
1.

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

The case was Royal Canadian Legion Norwood (Alberta) Branch 178 v Edmonton.123
The issue was simple. Between 1971 and 1986, the plaintiff had been assessed
for, and paid, municipal taxes on its property. It had done so unaware that
the Municipal Taxation Act exempted land owned by, and primarily used for,
branches of the Royal Canadian Legion.124 The city assessor had known of
the exempting provision, but mistakenly thought that it did not apply to the
plaintiff. It was not until May 1987 that the plaintiff first learned of its possible
eligibility under the Act. The plaintiff sought restitution from the City of its
overpaid taxes back to 1971.
The City pleaded limitation.125 The trial judge held that time was postponed
until the plaintiff discovered the mistake and that its restitution claim, filed in
122. Elliott, Häcker & Mitchell, supra note 75 at 4.
123. 111 DLR (4th) 141 (Alta CA) [Royal Canadian Legion Norwood Alta CA].
124. Municipal Taxation Act, RSA 1980, c M-31, s 25(1)(g). See Royal Canadian Legion Norwood
(Alberta) Branch 178 v Edmonton, [1992] 6 WWR 265 at paras 5-6 (Alta QB) (CanLII)
[Royal Canadian Legion Norwood Alta QB].
125. It was agreed that the Limitation of Actions Act 1980 governed the case. See Limitations of
Action Act 1980, supra note 42, s 4(1)(e); Royal Canadian Legion Norwood Alta QB, supra
note 124 at para 58; Royal Canadian Legion Norwood Alta CA, supra note 123 at 146. The
limitation period on taxes in arrears did not apply to the claim. See Tax Recovery Act, RSA
1980, c T-1, s 30(1) [Tax Recovery Act].
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March 1990, was timely.126 The Court of Appeal of Alberta disagreed.127 Notably,
it did so on the basis that the statutory tax exemption was discoverable within
the ordinary six-year period of limitation (thus negating the justification for
extending time). In the alternative, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s mistaken
understanding of the law was not relevant to the question of discoverability at
all. The pertinent question for the court was “whether it is the ‘discovery’ of the
facts or of the law that is at issue in the computation of the limitation period.”128
The court considered that it was when the plaintiff had discovered the facts that
grounded its claim that the cause of action accrued. It was not when the plaintiff
came to realize the legal significance of those facts. The Norwood Legion had
known in May 1971 “all the facts relevant to the effect on it … of the Municipal
Taxation Act.”129 That the plaintiff had not known the law “did not postpone the
limitation period of six years.”130
Plaintiffs who are ignorant of the law are expected to inform themselves
by, if necessary, retaining a lawyer.131 So in Brandner v Alberta, a plaintiff who
filed a civil suit against a police officer could not pray in aid discoverability after
erroneously assuming that he could not sue until after the criminal charges
wrongfully brought against him had been dropped.132 Familiarity with the legal
process, hiring of counsel, and collection of evidence are not constituent elements
of a legal claim. The limitation clock does not stop for parties who take no or
inadequate steps to apprise themselves of the law and proceed on an erroneous
assumption of their legal rights and powers.
These principles hold despite the SCC’s judgment in Rafuse, in which
limitation was postponed some nine years after the commission of an error of
law. Rafuse was a claim against solicitors for negligence in the execution of a
mortgage transaction. The appellant mortgagee had received from its solicitors
a certificate of title in 1969 recording the mortgage. In 1977, in the course
of foreclosure proceedings, the validity of the mortgage was challenged as
contravening the Nova Scotia Companies Act, which prohibited companies from
assisting financially in their own share purchases.133 The trial court held that the
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Royal Canadian Legion Norwood Alta QB, supra note 124 at para 27.
Royal Canadian Legion Norwood Alta CA, supra note 123 at 150.
Ibid at 149 [emphasis in original].
Ibid.
Ibid.
VAH v Lynch, 1998 ABQB 622 at para 47.
2014 ABQB 211 at paras 43-44. Cf HF Pension Trustees Ltd v Ellison, [1999] PNLR 894 at
904-905 (Ch); Sandhu v HM Revenue and Customs, [2017] EWHC 60 (QB) at para 27.
133. Companies Act, RSNS 1967, c 42, s 96(5).
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mortgage did not violate the Act and was valid;134 the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal held it was void in part;135 and the SCC held that it did violate the Act and
was void in its entirety.136 Following that decision in 1980, the mortgagee sued
its solicitors, who pleaded limitation.137 Their alleged negligence138 had occurred
in 1968, when they arranged the mortgage in ignorance of the Companies Act’s
restriction.139 This, they argued, was a mistake of law for which discoverability
could not apply to postpone the running of limitation.140
The SCC properly held that the proceedings had been brought within time.
The limitation period did not, though, run from the Court’s judgment in 1980,
which had finally resolved the parties’ ignorance of the law.141 Of importance
was that the mortgagee had reasonably relied on its solicitors’ advice and
representations.142 While the solicitors had no excuse for overlooking their own
mistake, the pertinent question was when could the mortgagee reasonably have
discovered their solicitors’ negligence? The Court held that it was when the
mortgage was challenged in 1977 that the mortgagee could reasonably have
learned that the security was potentially invalid and unenforceable, and thus
that their solicitors had acted negligently. Proceedings having been filed within
six years of that date,143 their claim in professional negligence succeeded.144 The
mortgagee in Rafuse could be considered to be in a similar position to the plaintiffs
in McWhorter and Hill.145 It was not the plaintiffs’ mistake of law that justified the
postponement of limitation. It was their reasonable reliance on the defendants
(the solicitors in Rafuse and the Registrar of Land Titles in McWhorter and Hill).
Accordingly, time ran from the courts’ assessment of when the plaintiffs could
reasonably have discovered and challenged those defendants’ mistakes.
134. Central and Eastern Trust Co v Stonehouse Motel and Restaurant Ltd (1977), 81 DLR
(3d) 495 (NS SC).
135. Irving Oil Ltd. v Central and Eastern Trust Co (1978), 89 DLR (3d) 374 (NS CA).
136. Central and Eastern Trust Co v Irving Oil Ltd, [1980] 2 SCR 29.
137. Statute of Limitations 1967, supra note 42, s 2(1)(e) (providing that actions in contract and
tort must be commenced “within six years after the cause of … action arose”).
138. The courts also disagreed over whether the solicitors had been negligent. See Rafuse, supra
note 1 at 210-14.
139. Ibid at 219-20.
140. The respondents succeeded on this argument before the Court of Appeal (but the Supreme
Court overturned it on further appeal). See Central Trust Co v Rafuse et al (1983), 147 DLR
(3d) 260 (NS CA).
141. Rafuse, supra note 1 at 219-24.
142. Ibid at 216.
143. Statute of Limitations 1967, supra note 42, s 2(1)(e).
144. Rafuse, supra note 1 at 224.
145. See Part II(A), above.
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2.

MISJUDGEMENT OF THE LAW

As the three tiers of contradictory judgments in Rafuse demonstrate, it is not
uncommon for those learned in the law to err in its interpretation or application.
One might misconstrue a legal provision, as did the tax assessor in Royal Canadian
Legion Norwood. Or, the state of the law may be uncertain such that competent
lawyers would disagree on it, as in Rafuse. As with ignorance, adjudicative
resolution of a misjudgement of the law does not trigger discoverability so as to
postpone the running of limitation. Time will not stay paused where a plaintiff
unreasonably fails to appreciate the legal significance of their circumstances.
Nor will limitation be postponed for plaintiffs who learn by a judgment that they
have instigated the wrong legal process in pursuit of an otherwise legitimate claim.
Justice Slatter in Papaschase Band No. 136 v Canada (AG) summarized this
first implication as follows:146
What must be discoverable is the facts underlying the claim; ignorance of the law
or subsequent discovery that a cause of action exists at law does not extend the
limitation …. Subsequent clarification or evolution of the law does not postpone
the discovery of the material facts so as to extend the limitation period.

Discoverability does not postpone limitation until the point at which a
plaintiff has recognized the significance of the material facts. Thus, in Luscar
Ltd. v Pembina Resources Ltd., the Court of Appeal of Alberta overturned a trial
judge’s ruling that “a cause of action … does not arise and the limitation period
does not commence to run until the injured party is,” or “should be deemed to
be,” “aware of his rights.”147 To the question of what must be discovered, the court
found its answer in Royal Canadian Legion Norwood: It is the facts, not the law.148
Addressing the undiscovered breach of contract at issue, the court concluded that
the claimants’ failure to “determine that they had a cause of action” was “not a
burden which the appellant must bear.”149
The second implication was demonstrated in Salna v Awad.150 The claimant
(Dover) sought to recover investment payments that it had made (from March
2003) on behalf of a defaulting joint venture partner (Awad). After failing,
146. 2004 ABQB 655 at para 136, considering Limitation of Actions Act, RSA 1980, c L-15, s 4(1)
(e). See also Stobbe v Paramount Investments Inc, 2013 ABCA 384 at paras 13, 15.
147. [1995] 2 WWR 153 at 71 [Luscar CA], rev’g (1991), 85 Alta LR (2d) 46 at 83 (QB) [Luscar
QB] [emphasis in original]. See New Brunswick v LeBlanc, 2013 NBCA 9 at paras 13-15.
148. Luscar CA, supra note 147 at 74-75, citing Royal Canadian Legion Norwood CA, supra
note 123 at 149.
149. Luscar CA, supra note 147 at 79-80.
150. Salna v Awad Alta CA, supra note 76.
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in protracted litigation in Ontario,151 to set-off the amounts owed against Awad’s
share of revenue, Dover commenced unjust enrichment proceedings in Alberta in
January 2007. Awad responded by pleading, inter alia, limitation. The Court of
Queen’s Bench of Alberta considered that Dover’s unjust enrichment claim had
become warranted only after the Ontario court had determined in August 2006
that Dover was not entitled to set-off Awad’s debt by withholding revenues.152
On that basis, Dover’s action would fall within the two-year limitation period.153
But the Court of Appeal of Alberta disagreed.154 It found that Dover’s error
was apparent from a 2004 judgment of the Ontario court.155 More pertinently,
Dover was wrong to presume that its error of law would postpone the running
of limitation at all:156
Dover’s mistaken belief that it was entitled to withhold payment of the [joint
venture] revenues was not a basis for postponing the running of time. The mistake
in this case was one of law rather than fact. Generally speaking, discoverability in
Alberta law refers to facts, not law. … [E]rror or ignorance of law, or uncertainty of
the law, does not postpone any limitation period.

The Court of Appeal of Alberta characterized the Ontario judgment as
having clarified the law and the parties’ respective rights under it. The Ontario
judgment did not create new rights and it was not materially relevant to Dover’s
restitutionary claim. The limitation period ran, instead, from when Awad had

151. In a judgment delivered on 21 September 2004, Justice Spence held that Dover was not
entitled to set-off the production revenues against Awad’s unpaid share of expenses and
directed Dover to pay over the withheld funds. Awad v Dover Investments Ltd (2004), 133
ACWS (3d) 788 (Ont Sup Ct). However, before entering judgment, Justice Spence heard
further evidence which caused him, on 3 February 2005, to set aside that direction. Awad
v Dover Investments Ltd (2005), 1 BLR (4th) 173. Justice Spence then received further
submissions and varied his order again on 30 August 2006, concluding that there was no
proper basis for Dover to withhold funds from Awad. His formal judgment, released on 11
January 2007, directed payment of the net withheld funds to Awad, without prejudice to
Dover’s rights to sue Awad. Salna v Awad Alta CA, supra note 76 at paras 18-19.
152. Salna v Awad, 2010 ABQB 419 at paras 24-25 [Salna v Awad Alta QBD].
153. Alberta Limitations Act, supra note 59, s 3(1)(a)(iii) (limiting claims to a remedial order to
“2 years after the date on which the claimant first knew, or in the circumstances ought to
have known, … that the injury … warrants bringing a proceeding”).
154. Salna v Awad Alta CA, supra note 76 at para 26.
155. Ibid at para 27.
156. Ibid at para 28.
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become enriched to the detriment of Dover.157 Plaintiffs are expected to follow
correct legal process. A judgment pointing out that they have not done so does
not give rise to, or extend, a cause of action.158
D. MISTAKEN LAW

It is a “mistake” to act pursuant to a positive law that is itself found to be invalid.
Costello v Calgary illustrates acting under a mistaken law: For over a decade,
an ultra vires by-law remained in effect until the SCC declared it void.159 The
Court’s judgment revealed not only that the by-law was unlawful, but that actions
taken under its authority—the expropriation of the plaintiffs’ property—were
also unlawful. They were the result of a mistake of law.
Likewise, when a judicial decision is overruled or a new legal precedent is
established, it may be that those who acted under an earlier understanding of the
law will in hindsight be found to have laboured under a mistake. Judicial decisions
of remedial invalidity are presumed to operate retroactively.160 But they do not,
in Canada, implicate discoverability to postpone the running of limitation.
1.

OVERRULED OR NEW PRECEDENT

An argument that discoverability should apply to situations where the law
“changes” was raised in Cunningham v Pinckney.161 The plaintiffs had sought
to introduce into proceedings under the Fatal Accidents Act162 a new cause of
action that had become recognized as part of provincial law following the Court
of Appeal of Alberta’s judgment in Duncan Estate v Baddeley.163 Baddeley had
set a new precedent in upholding the viability of a fatal accidents claim by a
deceased child’s estate for lost future earnings. In Cunningham, the Cunningham
family contended that it was not until Baddeley that they could pursue such an

157. Ibid at paras 30-36. The pertinent question was when had “all of the various elements of the
cause of action” occurred? The Court of Appeal found that Awad was not enriched when
Dover made the payment on his behalf. It was when Awad accepted the benefit of a farm-out
agreement on 6 August 2005. This was the point that Awad “turned the item to account.”
And proceedings were commenced within two years of that date.
158. See also Laasch v Turenne, 2012 ABCA 32 [Laasch Alta CA]; Hope v RM of Parkdale #498,
supra note 47 at para 62.
159. Costello 1987 Alta QB, supra note 80 at paras 2-3.
160. Canada v Hislop, supra note 120 at para 83.
161. 2001 ABCA 38 at para 2 [Cunningham].
162. RSA 1980, c F-5.
163. (1997), 145 DLR (4th) 708 (Alta CA) [Baddeley].
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action in their own proceedings.164 The chambers judge at first instance accepted
the argument.165 The Court of Appeal of Alberta rejected it.166 The unanimous
judgment noted that in the ordinary course a novel precedent is not understood
to “change” the law and, even where it was, the authorities ran against extending
discoverability to situations where the law changes:167
The law is often uncertain, and deciding whether the law of a given province had
changed on some particular date, or had merely become clearer or less clear, would
be a difficult exercise. The Luscar, Hill, and Royal Canadian Legion cases expressly
say that uncertainty of the law does not postpone limitation periods. The rationale
for the bar to relying upon ignorance of the law extends far beyond ignorance of
clear law.

The following year, the SCC rejected a similar argument in Wewaykum
Indian Band v Canada.168 There, two First Nations bands had filed proceedings
against each other and against the federal Crown claiming that but for breaches
of fiduciary duties by the Crown, each band would possess the other’s land. The
event that precipitated this litigation was the SCC’s decision in Guerin v R, which
recognized for the first time the right of a band to claim financial compensation
from the Crown “for breach of fiduciary duty in the disposition of part of its
reserve.”169 The Court in Wewaykum Band unanimously rejected the argument
that the governing limitation period170 was postponed until the claimants had
become aware of the novel cause of action upheld in Guerin. Justice Binnie for the
Court found that the bands had received independent legal advice by the 1930s
and had been aware of the material facts on which their later claims were based.171
The neighbouring bands had elected not to disturb each other by pursuing legal
action at the time. What had changed upon release of Guerin was that the bands
became aware of the possibility of compensation from the Crown. But, Justice
Binnie held, “[a]wareness of the availability of a claim in equity for financial
compensation against the Crown does not … turn what the band regarded as an
equitable situation into an inequitable situation.”172 The band’s “discovery” that
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Cunningham v Irvine-Adams, 1999 ABQB 517 at para 14.
Ibid at para 56-58.
Cunningham, supra note 161.
Ibid at para 5.
2002 SCC 79 [Wewaykum Band].
Ibid at para 64, citing Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 [Guerin].
Limitation Act, RSBC 1979, c 236, s 14(1); Federal Court Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 39(1). The
Limitation Act was incorporated by reference to the Federal Court Act.
171. Wewaykum Band, supra note 168 at para 123.
172. Ibid at para 124.
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it could have brought an action against the Crown did not turn their prior views
of their positions into newly actionable claims.173
2.

VOID LEGISLATION

Costello showed that a judicial determination that a by-law is ultra vires is not in
itself a materially relevant event for the purposes of determining when a cause of
action is discoverable.174 Herman v Alberta (Public Trustee)175 and Goodswimmer
v Canada (Attorney General)176 show that the same result follows when the
impugned provision is in a statute. The Herman claims were for damages under
the Fatal Accidents Act177 arising from a deadly airplane crash in 1997. When
proceedings were filed in 1999, the legislation did not expressly allow adult
children to claim bereavement damages, and so no such claim was filed. In 2004,
the Court of Appeal of Alberta in Ferraiuolo Estate v Olson178 struck down the
age and marital restrictions in the Fatal Accidents Act179 for violating the Charter
equality rights of married and older children.180 In light of Ferraiuolo, the adult
children plaintiffs in Herman sought bereavement damages.181
The Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta considered the amendments to be
timely particularizations of the plaintiffs’ initial claims,182 but proceeded in obiter
to dismiss Ferraiuolo’s relevance. Justice RP Marceau averred that Ferraiuolo
had not added anything to what the Herman plaintiffs could themselves have
pleaded when they first filed suit.183 It had been open to them to challenge the
constitutionality of the age and marital restrictions, just as it had been for the
Ferraiuolo plaintiffs. Their claim for bereavement “was discoverable as soon as

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See also Stewart Estate, supra note 62 at para 206.
See Part II(A), above.
2005 ABQB 337 [Herman].
2017 ABCA 365, leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, 37899 (5 July 2018)
[Goodswimmer Alta CA].
Supra, note 162.
2004 ABCA 281 [Ferraiuolo].
Supra note 160, s 8(2)(c).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Herman, supra note 173.
Ibid at paras 33-35, applying Limitations Act, RSA 2000, c L-12, s 3(1)(a).
Herman, supra note 175 at para 36-37.
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all of the underlying facts required to make out that claim were known, i.e.,
in October, 1997.”184
A similar point was made in Goodswimmer.185 Ten years after holding a
referendum in which the Sturgeon Lake Band approved a settlement of historic
grievances with Canada and Alberta, the SCC in Corbiere v Canada186 declared
the legislative provisions on which the Band’s referendum had been modelled as
unconstitutional.187 The Goodswimmer plaintiffs argued that Corbiere rendered
their settlement agreement void, which they could only have discovered once
Corbiere was handed down, rendering their lawsuits against the Crown timely.188
These arguments failed both at first instance and on appeal. First, the courts found
that the holding of a referendum had been a prudent, but not a legal, precondition
for approving the settlement, so Corbiere was not binding authority.189 Second,
even if it were binding, it was “untenable” that Corbiere could have had the effect
of postponing limitation in the Goodswimmer proceedings.190 The courts affirmed
the error-of-law exception.191 The Corbiere decision had not given rise to any
material facts that had not already been available to the Goodswimmer plaintiffs.
What it had done was expose a potential legal argument that they had failed to
consider. The plaintiffs’ subsequent discovery of their potential error of law did
not postpone their time for litigating that argument. Moreover, “strong policy
reasons mitigate[d] against” co-opting a judicial decision as a basis for reopening
disputes in non-related parties’ cases.192 Discoverability being deemed irrelevant,
the Band’s lawsuit was time-barred.

184. Ibid at paras 38, 40; Limitations Act, RSA 2000, c L-12, ss 6(1), (2). Ultimately,
discoverability was not a material issue because, even aside from the claimants’ success on
their first argument, the applications were found to fall within an exception in the Act.
185. Goodswimmer Alta CA, supra note 176. See also Stoney Nakoda Nations v Canada, 2016
ABQB 193, aff’d 2017 ABCA 432.
186. (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203 [Corbiere].
187. Indian Act, RSC1985, c I-5, s 77(1).
188. Goodswimmer v Canada (AG), 2016 ABQB 384 at paras 419, 459 [Goodswimmer Alta QB].
189. Ibid at paras 415, 423; Goodswimmer Alta CA, supra note 185 at para 91.
190. Goodswimmer Alta QB, supra note 188 at para 460; Corbiere v Canada, [1994] 1 FC 394,
aff’d in part [1997] 1 FC 689. It is curious that everyone involved assumed that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Corbiere was the pertinent event, when it was the Federal Court in 1993
that first issued a declaration that s 77(1) was unconstitutional. Arguably, even if the Band’s
arguments were right, they should have issued proceedings after the Federal Court’s decision
was handed down, in which case they still would have been time-barred.
191. Goodswimmer Alta QB, supra note 188 at para 460, aff’d 2017 ABCA 365 at para 119.
192. Goodswimmer Alta QB, supra note 188 at para 423-24, aff’d 2017 ABCA 365 at para 92. See
Part IV, below.
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To the extent that these cases hold that adjudicative declarations of ultra vires
legislation are irrelevant considerations, the holdings are apt. As Part III, below,
will show, these cases sit at odds with English jurisprudence, where disapplication
of discriminatory legislation is thought to provide a basis for extending the
temporal reach of a cause of action.

III. THE ERROR OF THE EXCEPTION
Despite its prevalence in case law, Canada’s exception to the discoverability
principle is jurisprudentially shallow. The “facts, not law” mantra is often
rehearsed without explanation of how law is to be distinguished from fact or
how the exception is reconcilable with discoverability being a “general rule” for
interpreting the running of limitation on causes of action.193 Nor has the conflict
with English precedent been acknowledged. In practice, the error-of-law rule may
overly curtail rights by protecting those who make legal rules (the Crown and
public authorities) and impeding those who have been harmed by unjust laws.
A. RESURRECTING THE FACT/LAW DISTINCTION

The error-of-law exception is conceptually flawed. It rests on a distinction that
the SCC has already renounced. During the previous two centuries, it was
conventional to invoke the maxim ignorantia juris non excusat to bar recovery of
payments made under a mistake of law. The rationale, given in Bilbie v Lumley,
was that, “[e]very man must be taken to be cognisant of the law; otherwise there
is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance might not be carried. It would
be urged in almost every case.”194 This mistake-of-law bar on civil recovery has
since been abandoned across the common law world.195 The rule rested on a
misconception that because mistake-of-law cannot be invoked as a defence by
accused wrongdoers, that plaintiffs should also be barred from grounding claims
in mistake of law. But plaintiffs in such cases are not seeking to be excused
from the law. Rather, they are invoking the mistake positively to justify their
claim for recovery.196
193. Rafuse, supra note 1 at 224.
194. (1802) 2 East 469 at 449, Lord Ellenborough CJ.
195. Mitchell McInnes, The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution
(LexisNexis, 2014) at 380.
196. Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, revised ed (Clarendon Press, 1989)
at 164-67; E Allan Farnsworth, Alleviating Mistakes: Reversal and Forgiveness for Flawed
Perceptions (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 143-48.
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The SCC redressed this problem in Air Canada v British Columbia197 and
Canadian Pacific Air Lines v British Columbia.198 These conjoined cases concerned
two distinct mistakes of law. The former was a case of mistaken law: The Court
held that taxes levied prior to British Columbia’s Gasoline Tax Act199 being declared
constitutionally invalid were recoverable in restitution.200 The latter was a case
of mistaken application of the law: The legislation itself was valid,201 but it had
been misapplied to the claimants.202 Both reasons prima facie substantiated the
airlines’ claims for restitution against the Crown. Justice La Forest, delivering the
lead judgments, held that “the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake
of law should play no part” in determining the claimants’ restitution claims.203
Justice Wilson concurred “that moneys paid under a mistake of law should, like
moneys paid under a mistake of fact, be recoverable.”204
If mistake-of-law can provide a reason for restitution, then it must be a
material element of a cause of action, and against such actions time can only
run when all of the elements—including mistake—can be discovered. The
error-of-law exception—which holds that a mistake of fact may postpone time,
but a mistake of law may not—reintroduces the fact/law distinction into the
question of when a mistake becomes salient. Yet, like the rule in Bilbie v Lumley,
this rule offers no practicable framework for distinguishing law from fact.
Is ignorance of a relevant statutory provision, for instance, an error of law (as
Royal Canadian Legion Norwood held)205 or a failure to appreciate “a matter of
fact”?206 The distinction becomes so “blurred” as to be unhelpful.207 Reliance on it
will only reanimate, in the limitation inquiry, arbitrariness previously jettisoned
from the cause-of-action inquiry.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Air Canada, supra note 3.
Canadian Pacific Air Lines, supra note 3.
1948, RSBC 1960, c 162.
Air Canada, supra note 3 at 1186.
Social Services Tax Act, RSBC 1979, c 388.
McInnes, supra note 195 at 382.
Air Canada, supra note 3 at 1201. Justice Wilson dissented in the substantive Air Canada
decision but explicitly expressed support for abolishing “the traditional rule as to the
irrecoverability of monies paid under a mistake of law” (ibid at 1214).
Canadian Pacific Air Lines, supra note 3 at 1158.
Royal Canadian Legion Norwood Alta CA, supra note 123.
James Edelman & Elise Bant, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed (Hart, 2016) at 186 (discussing
David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, (1992), 175 CLR 353).
Pitt v Holt, [2013] UKSC 26 at para 104.
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B. INSULAR DEVELOPMENT

The Canadian jurisprudence can be criticized for its insular development. The
error-of-law exception has emerged without regard to English precedent, despite
the countries’ limitation statutes’ shared origins. Peculiarly, until very recently
England’s courts had taken the opposite view to Canada’s. English precedent
had held that limitation did not begin to run on mistake-of-law claims until
an “authoritative” judgment finally resolves the impugned point of law.208 The
English rule was illogical and indefensible, as elsewhere explained.209 Its presence
nevertheless refuted the Canadian presumption of discoverability’s sheer
irrelevance. Both jurisdictions could learn from each other to reach a coherent
middle ground on the problem.
C. A NOT-SO-“GENERAL RULE”

The SCC in Rafuse styled discoverability as a “general rule” for interpreting how
limitation runs against causes of action.210 It has since reaffirmed this interpretive
position.211 This position might at first seem to vindicate a prominent critique that
has been advanced concerning the scope of the English discoverability rule for
mistakes.212 It was held in Phillips-Higgins v Harper that England’s discoverability
provision postpones time only “where the mistake is an essential ingredient of
the cause of action.”213 In an early edition of their seminal text, Robert Goff and
Gareth Jones criticized this constrained scope and suggested that the English
discoverability rule for mistake should be “read generously” so as to reach the
“desirable result” of postponing limitation in all cases of material mistake.214 Prior
to being elevated to the High Court of Australia, James Edelman too advocated
for a broader interpretive approach. Edelman argued that there was nothing in
the text, history, or principle of the English Limitation Act 1980 that “warrants
a requirement that mistake be an element of the cause of action” in order for
208. FII Test Claimants v HMRC (CA), supra note 75 at para 372. The UK Supreme Court
recently overruled this line of precedent, although it did not adopt a Canada-style approach
and continues to apply discoverability to mistakes of law: FII Test Claimants v HMRC (SC),
supra note 75 at para 243.
209. See Beswick, “Discoverability of Mistakes of Law,” supra note 4.
210. Rafuse, supra note 1 at 224.
211. Pioneer Corp, supra note 5 at paras 34-38; cf ibid at paras 140-50, Côté J, dissenting.
212. Limitation Act 1980 E&W, supra note 69, s 32(1) (quoted in Part I(D), above).
213. [1954] 1 QB 411 at 419 (CA) [emphasis added], aff’d in Test Claimants in the Franked
Investment Income Group Litigation v Inland Revenue, [2012] UKSC 19 at paras 49-50,
61-62, Lord Walker. Ibid, at paras 181-83, Lord Sumption.
214. The Law of Restitution, 4th ed (Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) at 769.
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a plaintiff to benefit from the discoverability provision’s extended limitation
period.215 He contended that it should be sufficient that a claimant laboured
under a relevant mistake—more precisely, that the discoverability rule should
postpone limitation whenever a mistake was “causally significant to the relief
sought,” such that the reason for the plaintiff bringing an action for relief was a
consequence of their mistake.216 Accordingly, in a case where tax was paid as a
consequence of the plaintiff’s mistaken belief that the law required it, Edelman
argued that the postponed period of limitation should not commence until the
plaintiff could have discovered their mistake of law.217 The period should not vary
depending on the cause of action—it should not matter, for instance, whether
the action for relief was framed as unjust enrichment for a mistake or under the
constitutional right to restitution of unlawfully exacted taxes.218 Discoverability
should apply whether or not the mistake was essential to pleading the action.
It is clear that Canadian jurisprudence does embrace an expansive role for
discoverability. Part I, above, showed that the postponed limitation period is not
constrained to specific contexts as it is in England. Yet, Part II’s analysis, above,
controverts Edelman’s thesis. It affirms a rule that rejects postponement where
the reason for the plaintiff’s delay in suing was an error of law. In Royal Canadian
Legion Norwood, for example, the plaintiffs paid taxes for fifteen years under
a mistaken belief that the law required it, while the tax assessor accepted the
payments under a mistaken belief that a statutory exception did not apply.219
In Costello v Calgary and Herman v Alberta, the claimants faced legislative
provisions that purported to impede their claims, and promptly filed damages
actions after those provisions were struck down as ultra vires.220 The claimants in
Cunningham v Pinckney and Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada acted similarly
once new precedent exposed to them their legal errors,221 as did the claimants in
McWhorter v Alberta and Hill v Alberta, who issued proceedings once their titles
to property were stripped by court order.222 And in Luscar v Pembina Resources
215. “Limitation Periods and the Theory of Unjust Enrichment” (2005) 68 Mod L
Rev 848 at 851.
216. Ibid at 853. Correspondingly, “where the ‘gist of the action’ was the misconduct of
the defendant rather than the claimant’s mistake, the limitation period would not be
extended” (ibid).
217. Ibid, citing Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, supra note 75.
218. Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue, [1993] 1 AC 70; Kingstreet Investments
Ltd v New Brunswick (Department of Finance), 2007 SCC 1 [Kingstreet Investments].
219. See Part II(C)(1), above.
220. See Part II(D)(2), above.
221. See Part II(D)(1), above.
222. See Part II(A), above.
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and Salna v Awad, the claimants were delayed in bringing their respective actions
owing to mistakes as to their legal rights.223 Yet the discoverability arguments
failed in each case. The claimants’ errors of law were held to be irrelevant to
the determination of limitation on their actions. The errors did not inform the
question of discoverability.
Even the landmark judgment of Kingstreet Investments v New Brunswick
did not invoke discoverability, though the taxing regulation that the SCC
found to be unconstitutional had operated since 1983 without legal challenge
until 2001.224 Instead, the Court held that the restitution claims were subject
to the ordinary limitation period. The six-year period commenced at the time
of the erroneous payments of tax.225 Discoverability was not even addressed in
the litigation.226 Carving out mistake-of-law actions undermines the claim that
discoverability is a “general rule” for interpreting the running of limitation on
causes of action in Canada.
D. OVER-CURTAILING RIGHTS OF ACTION

Excluding errors of law from the discoverability inquiry can lead to actions
expiring before a claim can feasibly be brought. This has been a particular
concern for claims advanced by Indigenous groups concerning historic grievances
against the Crown. The error-of-law exception is a significant obstacle to such
claims.227 If plaintiffs are able to prove that they had been unable to bring suit
during the ordinary period of limitation, why should the law rigidly prohibit
such proceedings?

223.
224.
225.
226.

See Part II(C)(2), above.
Kingstreet Investments, supra note 218.
Ibid at para 61.
Instead, the appellants had argued (unsuccessfully) that their restitution claims were not
subject to the Limitation of Actions Act, RSNB 1973, c L8, at all. See Kingstreet Investments
Ltd v New Brunswick, 2005 NBCA 56 at para 40; Michael Pal, “The Supreme Court of
Canada’s Approach to the Recovery of Ultra Vires Taxes: At the Border of Private and Public
Law” (2008) 66 UT Fac L Rev 65 at 88-94 (arguing “that limitation periods should not
apply to the recovery of ultra vires taxes.” (ibid at 93)).
227. Goodswimmer Alta QB, supra note 188 at para 460 (aff’d 2017 ABCA 365);
Wewaykum Band, supra note 168. Cf Department of Justice Canada, Attorney General
of Canada’s Directive on Civil Litigation Involving Indigenous Peoples (Department of
Justice Canada, 2019).
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The error-of-law exception is also descriptively unpersuasive. There are
two important judgments it cannot explain.228 The first is the SCC’s decision
in Rafuse.229 Recall that the Court held that the plaintiff mortgagee was within
time in 1980 to sue its solicitors for negligent mortgage execution in 1968, even
though the governing limitation period was only six years. The judgment predates
Costello’s articulation of the error-of-law exception and did not specifically
address it. The Court held that it was only when the mortgage was challenged
in foreclosure proceedings in 1977 that the mortgagee could reasonably have
learned that the certificate of title provided by its solicitors was potentially invalid
and unenforceable, and thus that the solicitors had acted negligently. The Court
applied the discoverability principle, though the plaintiff’s error (i.e., believing it
had a valid mortgage) was ultimately one of law. This seems right. Had the Court
treated the error as an exception to discoverability, the plaintiff’s action would have
been time-barred before it could reasonably have been discovered, since in law
the company suffered the damage in 1968 when it failed to acquire an interest
in the property as security for its loan.230 As the plaintiffs could not have been
expected to second-guess their solicitors at the time, applying an error-of-law
exception would have led to an injustice.
The second judgment is the Court of Appeal of Alberta’s decision in
McWhorter v Alberta. The court held that the plaintiffs had been deprived of
their rights in 1943 when the Registrar of Land Titles mistakenly stripped the
owner of her interest in the property’s mines and minerals.231 From that date,
the plaintiffs erred in assuming good title in the subsurface property. The court
nevertheless averred that the limitation period might not have run until 1973,
when a caveat was registered on the certificate of title.232 Had the plaintiffs not

228. Cf Peel (Regional Municipality) v Canada (1986), [1987] 3 FC 103 at para 27 (WL) (which
was wrongly decided and overturned in [1992] 3 SCR 762 at 804-805). Cf David A Crerar,
“The Restitutionary Class Action: Canadian Class Proceedings Legislation as a Vehicle for
the Restitution of Unlawfully Demanded Payments, Ultra Vires Taxes, and Other Unjust
Enrichments” (1998) 56 UT Fac L Rev 47 at 85-86; Robert Chambers, “Restitution of
Money Paid to Third Persons: Peel (Regional Municipality) v The Queen” (1993) 57 Sask L
Rev 325 at 339-40.
229. See WH Hurlburt, “Hill v Registrar: Limitation of Actions, the Assurance Fund and the
Discoverability Rule” (1993) 31 Alta L Rev 692 at 705 (explaining the decision in Rafuse,
on the basis that “it may be that non-discoverability of law will lead to “non-discoverability”
of fact so as to prevent a limitation period from running”); Rafuse, supra note 1.
230. Ibid at 219-20.
231. McWhorter Alta CA, supra note 48 at para 3.
232. Ibid at paras 3-4. The Court declined to reach a conclusion on this point.
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been dilatory in filing their action at that time, then, their claim might not have
been time-barred.
These cases indicate that the error-of-law exception is misconceived. The
idea that juridical events are not a basis for postponing the running of limitation
periods is sound. But this is not because errors of law are never discoverable.
Rather, it is because they are presumptively always discoverable.

IV. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE, NOT EXCEPTION TO
PRINCIPLE
The Canadian rule should be reconceived as a presumption that errors of law
are discoverable, the burden of which is on plaintiffs to rebut. Discoverability
should apply to all errors—whether of fact or law. The purpose of discoverability
is to ensure that time does not expire before a reasonably diligent plaintiff could
have brought an action. Courts should not be constrained from considering
the circumstances faced by the particular plaintiffs before them in determining
whether their claims are time-barred.233
A. THE LAW’S DISCOVERABILITY

There have been few concerted efforts to justify Canada’s error-of-law exception.
In a case note on Hill, William Hurlburt acknowledged that an injustice may
follow “no less because it is ignorance of law rather than ignorance of fact,” but
contended that the balance of policy considerations favours the error-of-law
exception to discoverability, stating:234
For one thing, it would be enormously difficult for defendants to show that plaintiffs
knew or ought to have known about the relevant law. For another, judicial decisions
continually change the law and often confer new remedies or make old ones more
widely available … . Allowing plaintiffs to sue for old claims under the new rules
would create much injustice to defendants. Extending the “discoverability” rule to
include “discoverability” of law would defeat the policy objectives of limitations
statutes. Not extending it is an exercise of appropriate judicial restraint.

These arguments are not robust. The first objection could be addressed by
insisting that plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating (un)discoverability. The

233. See Alisia Adams, “Unforgiven Trespasses: Provincial Statutes of Limitations and Historical
Interference with Indian Lands” (2001) 7 Appeal 32; Mayo Moran, “The Problem of the
Past: How Historic Wrongs Became Legal Problems” (2019) UTLJ 421.
234. Hurlburt, supra note 229 at 703.
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second objection rests on an assumption of indeterminacy of limitation periods
that is not an inevitable consequence of subjecting errors of law to discoverability.
The categorization of errors of law as an exception to discoverability
is problematic because it suggests that a fact/law distinction governs the
interpretation of when actions arise even though the distinction does not govern
the content of said actions. It leads to the inference that limitation periods on
actions arising from errors of law would differ but for the courts’ adherence to the
exception. This inference is unsound. What is sound is the judicial inclination
from which the exception stems: That judicial decisions should not bear upon
when limitation runs against a claimant’s mistake.
To appreciate why, we must reflect on the purpose of the discoverability
principle: It is to provide that the time the legislature prescribes for suing
a defendant does not expire before a plaintiff is able to bring an action.235
Discoverability is not concerned with when it would be practical or convenient
for the plaintiff to sue.236 The driving question is when is it possible to do so.
The prima facie answer is: When the elements of the cause of action are able
to be discovered. A cause of action is “a factual situation the existence of which
entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.”237
An action in the tort of negligence, for instance, arises once a plaintiff (P) is able
to discover that a defendant (D) injured them, in circumstances where D should
not have done so, and that the injury caused P loss. An action for restitution of
mistakenly paid money arises once P is able to discover that they have paid D
money by mistake in circumstances where, had P not been mistaken at the time,
P would not have done so. Or, on the Garland approach, it arises once P is able
to discover that there was no juristic reason for D’s retention of the money.238
It is the material facts that inform the elements of a cause of action. It is the law
that tells us when those elements will be actionable before the courts. Yet, when
a mistake of law causes P to misidentify the propriety of D’s conduct, or is itself
an element of the cause of action, the mistake is necessarily relevant. That is
obviously so where the cause of action is unjust enrichment and the unjust factor
235. KLB v British Columbia, 2003 SCC 51 at para 55.
236. Novak, supra note 20 at para 65.
237. Letang v Cooper, [1965] 1 QB 232 at 242-43, endorsed in Markevich v Canada, 2003 SCC
9 at para 27; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Green, 2015 SCC 60 at para 188; July
v Neal (1986), 32 DLR (4th) 463 (Ont CA) at 471; 1100997 Ontario Ltd v North Elgin
Centre Inc, 2016 ONCA 848 at para 19. See also Zacks, supra note 10 at 169; French, supra
note 67 at 255.
238. Garland v Consumers’ Gas Co, 2004 SCC 25 at para 40. See Kerr v Baranow, 2011
SCC 10 at para 32.
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is mistake of law.239 In such a case it makes no sense to assert that the mistake of
law is irrelevant to the accrual of the cause of action. The action can only accrue
once the mistake element has been, or could be, discovered.
The question, then, is not when can the action be discovered setting aside
error or ignorance of the law. The question is when can its elements—including
the mistake of law—be discovered such that the plaintiff would be in a position
to plead the action? Stating the question in this way presupposes that we are
operating under a “Blackstonian paradigm” of adjudication.240 The suggestion
that there has been a mistake of law assumes that a plaintiff who in the past
acted inconsistently with the law, as declared today, was mistaken in doing so.241
If a judicial decision as to the state of the law today had the jurisprudential
effect of replacing previous valid law—so that the new precedent operated only
prospectively—then a plaintiff could not be considered mistaken in the past
when acting in accordance with the previous state of the law. No cause of action
in mistake of law could arise.242 The declaratory theory holds that common
law adjudication elucidates the law governing both future and past cases (i.e.,
both prospectively and retrospectively). Because the nature of adjudication is
backward-looking, actions that were taken on the basis of some contrary view
of the law must necessarily be considered to have been taken in error.243 It may
only be with hindsight that a plaintiff discovers the “correct” state of the law, and
thus the mistake. But on the theory that judicial decisions are declaratory of the
239. McInnes, supra note 195 at 380-83 (noting that the same result follows whether mistake is
understood as an “unjust factor” or as negating a “juristic reason” under Garland v Consumers’
Gas Co, supra note 238). See John D McCamus, “Unjust Enrichment, Existing Categories
and Kerr v Baranow: A Reply to Professor McInnes” (2012) 52 Can Bus LJ 390 at 392-93;
Steve Hedley, “What Is Happening to the Law of Unjust Enrichment?” in Paul Daley, ed,
Apex Courts and the Common Law (University of Toronto Press, 2019) at 373-75.
240. Canada v Hislop, supra note 120 at para 86. Or, more contemporarily, “Dworkinian.” See
Duncan Sheehan, “What Is a Mistake?” (2000) 20 LS 538 at 560.
241. John Finnis, “The Fairy Tale’s Moral” (1999) 115 Law Q Rev 170; Allan Beever, “The
Declaratory Theory of Law” (2013) 33 Oxford J Leg Stud 421 at 433-39.
242. See Part IV(D), below.
243. West Midland Baptist (Trust) Association Inc v Birmingham Corp (1969), [1970] AC 874 at
898-99, Lord Reid; National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd, [2005] UKHL 41
at para 12 [Re Spectrum Plus Ltd]. See also (in the criminal law context) R v Cottrell, [2007]
EWCA Crim 2016 at para 52, Sir Igor Judge P (“[f ]or the time being the court is bound by
what we shall identify as the declaratory principle of the common law”). Cf ibid at para 60;
R v Johnson, [2016] EWCA Crim 1613 at para 2 (“the Supreme Court identifies the law both
prospectively and retrospectively”); David Ormerod, “Jogee: Not the End of a Legal Saga but
the Start of One?” [2016] Crim L Rev 539 at 552; Karl Laird, “Joint enterprise: R v Johnson”
[2017] Crim L Rev 216 at 218.
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law governing past events, the correct state of the law must be deemed to have
been within reach at the time of the plaintiff’s action.244 If it was not, there could
be no “law” for the plaintiff to be mistaken of. Assuming, then, that there was a
“correct” state of the law at the time of the (trans)action, we must consider how a
plaintiff could have come to recognize it. Elsewhere I have proposed two tests that
can assist this inquiry.245 Here, we need only appreciate two basic propositions
in order to understand the correct characterization of Canada’s error-of-law rule.
First, if discovery of “the law” is to be approached analogously to discovery
of facts, then one point is clear: The accrual of an action does not depend upon
the findings of a court. A plaintiff does not need “perfect knowledge” or certainty
of the material facts that give rise to their action before the limitation period
begins to run.246 Take, for example, the negligent personal injury tort. In some
cases, an injury and its cause will be so obvious that a cause of action will be
discoverable (and the limitation period will commence) even before the plaintiff
seeks a medical opinion. In other cases, such as where the effects of an injury
are latent, the action will be held to accrue once the injury is diagnosed.247 The
situation is similar in respect of mistakes of fact. Where a plaintiff miscalculates
their liability to tax, the error is discoverable once the plaintiff is in a position to
realize their mistake. In no case is limitation deferred only until a court has made
findings of fact that the plaintiff has suffered an injury of which the defendant
was the cause, or that the plaintiff’s payment was indeed in error. Discoverability
concerns the plaintiff’s ability to plead a case. It does not defer limitation until
the issues in dispute are finally resolved. If it did, limitation acts would be hollow
statutes. Thus, Mew affirms that:248
The discovery of a claim does not depend upon the plaintiff knowing that his or
her claim is likely to succeed; the limitation period runs from when the prospective
plaintiff has or ought to have had knowledge of a potential claim, and the later
discover[y] of facts which change a borderline claim into a viable one does not
postpone the discovery of the claim.

244. Sheehan, supra note 240 at 559-60; Andrew Burrows, “Common Law Retrospectivity” in
Andrew Burrows, David Johnston & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds, Judge and Jurist: Essays
in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 548. Cf Deutsche
Morgan Grenfell, supra note 75 at paras 31, Lord Hoffmann, and 71, Lord Hope.
245. Samuel Beswick, “Discoverability Principles and the Law’s Mistakes” (2020) 136 Law Q
Rev 139 at 150-54.
246. Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at para 3.50.
247. Ibid at para 3.51.
248. Ibid at para 3.56 [emphasis added]; see also Richard James, “The Law Commission Report
on the Limitation of Actions” (2003) 22 CJQ 41 at 44; cf Edelman, supra note 215 at 853.
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This principle ties into a second proposition: That the limitation period
on mistakes of law depends—in the ordinary way—upon whether the plaintiff
could have discovered the mistake “by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”249 The
burden of proof is on the plaintiff.250 Where a plaintiff asserts that their error
of law caused them to delay bringing proceedings, it is incumbent on them to
demonstrate why this was so. If the plaintiff misunderstood their legal position,
they must show why they could not have discovered their position sooner. If it was
a statutory provision or legal precedent that stood in their way, the plaintiff must
show why they could not have challenged the point of law earlier. In practice, this
is often an insurmountable hurdle.
Laasch v Turenne was a case of a misunderstood legal position.251 The plaintiffs
thought that they could enforce in Alberta a judgment obtained in Montana via
the expedited process in the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.252 By the
time they realized that they did not qualify under that Act,253 the plaintiffs were
out of time to enforce the judgment by an ordinary common law action. The
discoverability principle did not assist them. The Court of Appeal of Alberta,
citing Justice McLachlin in Novak v Bond,254 held that the critical question was
whether “a reasonable person would consider that someone in the plaintiff’s
position, acting reasonably in light of his or her own circumstances and interests,
could—not necessarily should—bring an action.”255 That the plaintiffs themselves
did not think to register the judgment in the ordinary way did not detract from
the conclusion that, exercising reasonable diligence, the plaintiffs could have done
so. Their error of law was discoverable at the outset of the litigation and so, even
if the court had accepted the error as relevant, it could not serve as a basis for
deferring the running of time.
A similar outcome has followed in cases where claimants faced court
precedent256 or legislative provisions257 that purported to impede their claims.
The courts dismissed the claimants’ arguments on the basis that error of law

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Rafuse, supra note 1 at 224 [emphasis added].
Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at para 3.54.
See Part II(C)(2), above.
RSA 2000, c R-6.
Laasch v Turenne, 2009 ABQB 267.
Novak, supra note 20 at para 81.
Laasch Alta CA, supra note 158 at para 19 [emphasis added]; cf Allison & Co v Horner,
[2014] EWCA Civ 117 at paras 16, 19.
256. See Part II(D)(1), above.
257. See Part II(D)(2), above.
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was apparently irrelevant to the discoverability inquiry.258 A more principled
approach would have recognized that errors of law may be relevant to parties’
claims, but that such errors were nonetheless discoverable at the time of the
impugned (trans)actions. The implication is that it was always possible for the
plaintiffs, exercising reasonable diligence, to have challenged the law that they
later pointed to as erroneous. That they did not think to do so does not mean that
a plaintiff acting reasonably could not have done so. It is not essential to a claim
that a court in separate proceedings first resolves the state of the law under which
the plaintiffs found their complaint.
This recharacterization of the error-of-law rule reconciles the courts’
discoverability jurisprudence with the idea that mistake of law is not a bar to
recovery.259 In the first instance decision in Royal Canadian Legion Norwood,
Justice Gallant averred that an error-of-law exception would conflict with the
SCC’s holding in Air Canada “that the distinction between mistake of fact and
mistake of law is purely artificial and should not be given effect.”260 The point
was not addressed on appeal,261 but this article’s revised understanding avoids the
conflict. Discoverability should govern mistakes of both fact and law. A plaintiff’s
failure to appreciate their position under the law is not invariably irrelevant to
the running of limitation. But nor is it a matter that requires resolution by a
court before a plaintiff can be in a position to discover their cause of action.
Discoverability does not postpone the running of limitation until the point
at which the legal issue in dispute has reached its adjudicative end. As with a
mistake of fact, a mistake of law should prima facie be considered discoverable
when it is made.262 It is for the plaintiff to overcome the burden of rebutting that
presumption in order to benefit from the principle of discoverability.
B. INSIGHT INTO ENGLISH CASES

The revised approach would implement a shift from a bar on mistake-of-law
arguments to a presumption that such mistakes are discoverable. English courts
need not embrace Canada’s general principle of discoverability in order to
appreciate how this understanding might better inform their approach to mistakes
258. See also Dan Priel, “The Justice in Unjust Enrichment” (2014) 51 Osgoode Hall LJ 813 at
839 (contending that notions of property explain why in unjust enrichment “liability arise[s]
at the moment of enrichment and not at the moment of learning of it”).
259. Air Canada, supra note 3 at 1201; Canadian Pacific Air Lines, supra note 3 at 1156.
260. Royal Canadian Legion Norwood Alta QB, supra note 124 at para 43, citing Air
Canada, supra note 3.
261. Royal Canadian Legion Norwood Alta CA, supra note 123 at 149.
262. Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at para 3.94.
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of law. The common law of Canada preceded that of England in abandoning the
distinction in the treatment of restitution actions founded on mistakes of fact
and law.263 Canadian common law can also offer guidance toward re-evaluating
English jurisprudence on the discoverability of mistakes of law.
The main difference between this article’s revised approach and recent
English doctrine concerns where the burden of proof lies. The revised Canadian
approach rests on a presumption that the law can always (objectively) be
discovered with reasonable diligence, even though it might be some time before
a plaintiff (subjectively) discovers their mistake.264 Plaintiffs bear the burden
of rebutting this presumption by demonstrating that their suit could not have
been brought within the ordinary limitation period.265 The English approach
did the opposite. It rested on a presumption that a disputed point of law is not
reasonably discoverable until it has been “authoritatively” determined by a final
court.266 This placed the effective burden of proof onto defendants to show that
a plaintiff could have discovered their error of law sooner. It is a difficult burden
to discharge. In practice, this presumption tended to extend indeterminately
the running of limitation to the benefit of plaintiffs. In some cases, it enabled
plaintiffs to defer the running of time until an appellate court ruled in their own
case upon an impugned point of law, on the theory that such ruling renders the
law discoverable.267 In other words, time would remain paused even after the
plaintiff had brought an action.
Such a holding would be intolerable in Canada. In KLB v British Columbia,
the SCC rejected an argument that plaintiffs were not statute-barred because they
were unable fully to appreciate their personal injury actions, which arose from
abuse suffered as children, even while their claims were being litigated.268 Chief
Justice McLachlin held for the Court:269
This approach to reasonable discoverability is problematic. It rests on evidence that
the plaintiffs lacked sufficient awareness of the facts even after they had brought
their actions. Since the purpose of the rule of reasonable discoverability is to ensure
that plaintiffs have sufficient awareness of the facts to be able to bring an action, the
263. Air Canada, supra note 3, discussed in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council,
[1999] 2 AC 349.
264. Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at para 3.94. See Sheehan, supra note 240 at 559.
265. Mew, Limitations, supra note 2 at para 3.54.
266. FII Test Claimants v HMRC (CA), supra note 75 at para 372, overruled by FII Test Claimants
v HMRC (SC), supra note 75 at para 243.
267. FII Test Claimants v HMRC, (CA), supra note 75 at para 373.
268. Supra note 230.
269. Ibid at para 55, cited in HOOPP Realty, supra note 62 at para 206.
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relevant type of awareness cannot be one that it is possible to lack even after one has
brought an action.

Thus, even within a jurisdiction that embraced an expansive understanding
of the discoverability of mistakes, the outcome that Goff, Jones, and Edelman
advanced does not follow.270 These scholars considered that extending
discoverability to mistakes of law generally would defer time for litigating
whenever a judgment unexpectedly changes the law.271 Such a proposition is
not supported by the Canadian authorities, either on their current or revised
understanding. It would render limitation statutes ineffectual if limitation
periods commenced only once arguments over the law (and its application to
facts) were finally resolved in litigation. Such an approach does not reflect a
sound understanding of discoverability either in Canada or in England.
C. RELEVANCE TO THIRD-WAVE STATUTES

Much of the doctrine discussed in this article arose from interpretations of
Canada’s second-wave limitation statutes. But this article’s revised approach
survives Canada’s third-wave reforms,272 which centre limitation on the
discoverability of “claims” rather than the accrual of “causes of action.”273 The key
distinction is that the former depends upon whether damage or injury “warrants
bringing a proceeding,” whereas the latter does not.274 This consideration permits
limitation to be postponed when a claimants’ circumstances are such that “the
costs and strains of litigation would be overwhelming,”275 the injury did not
270. Cf Part III(C), above.
271. Edelman, supra note 215 at 853; James Edelman, “Chief Justice French, Judicial Power and
Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution” in Henry Jackson, ed, Essays in Honour
of Chief Justice French (Federation Press, 2019) at 103-104. See also Francis Rose, “Lapse
of Time: Limitation” in Peter Birks & Francis Rose, eds, Lessons of the Swaps Litigation
(Mansfield Press, 2000) at 379; Andrew Burrows, “Unjust Enrichment and Restitution” in
The Oxford Handbook of The New Private Law, Andrew S Gold, et al, eds, (Oxford University
Press, 2020) at 304.
272. HOOPP Realty, supra note 60 at paras 174-220; Ambrozic, supra note 60 at paras 29-32, 59;
Waap, supra note 60 at paras 123-26; Stewart Estate, supra note 60 at para 197; Miller, supra
note 60 at paras 91-100; Pecharsky, supra note 60 at paras 90-99. For summarized principles,
see Condominium Plan No 0625385, supra note 60 at para 20. See also Mew, Limitations,
supra note 2 at paras 3.48-3.53.
273. See Part I(C), above.
274. Zacks, supra note 10 at 166, 185. See e.g. Alberta Limitations Act, supra note 59, s 3(1)(a).
275. JN v Kozens, 2004 ABCA 394 at para 15 [Kozens]; Gayton v Lacasse, 2010 ABCA 123 at
para 30 [Lacosse]; Champagne v Sidorsky, 2017 ABQB 557 at para 34 [Sidorsky]. See Amack v
Wishewan, 2015 ABCA 147 at para 44 [Wishewan].
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appear to be serious,276 the fruits of litigation were thought to be minimal or
speculative, or “other personal circumstances combined to make it unfeasible to
initiate an action.”277
These third-wave statutory schemes do not postpone time where claimants
fail to take reasonable steps to inform themselves about the law, or to challenge
points of law in the course of legal proceedings. The Court of Appeal of Alberta
in Salna v Awad was right to overturn the trial judge’s holding that the plaintiff’s
unjust enrichment action in Alberta had not been “warranted”278 until the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice had dismissed its set-off claim in that province.279
Applying the error-of-law rule, the Court of Appeal of Alberta considered that
the plaintiff’s mistake of law “was not a basis for postponing the running of time”
on its claim.280 The court could have reached the same outcome by inferring
that the plaintiff’s mistake of law was discoverable when it was made.281 Before
he was elevated to the SCC, Justice Russell Brown held in Nipshank v Trimble
that Alberta’s modern discoverability provision does not “allow for delaying the
running of a limitation period until a plaintiff has secured legal advice that the
injury ‘warrants bringing a proceeding.’”282 The inquiry is concerned with “the
circumstances of the plaintiff herself or himself,” not with the legal position of
the plaintiff’s case.283 Limitation commences once a plaintiff has the means of
knowing that the defendant has inflicted an injury which warrants bringing a
proceeding, whether or not the plaintiff has actual knowledge.284 His Honour
properly concluded that “the plaintiff’s legal position—which she will typically
276. See ALRI Limitations, supra note 38 at 33, 64, cited in Atlanta Industrial Sales Ltd v Emerald
Management & Realty Ltd, 2006 ABQB 255 at para 192; Keyland Development Corporation v
Rocky View (Municipal District No 44), 2016 ABQB 735 at paras 109-10.
277. Kozens, supra note 275 at para 15; Lacasse, supra note 275 at para 30; Sidorsky, supra note 275
at para 34. See Nipshank v Trimble, 2014 ABQB 120 at para 12 [Trimble]; Sztuczka v Knebel,
2012 ABQB 72 at para 19; Schitthelm v Kelemen, 2017 ABQB 546 at para 213.
278. See e.g. Alberta Limitations Act, supra note 59, s 3(1)(a).
279. Salna v Awad Alta CA, supra note 76 at paras 27-28, rev’g Salna v Awad QBD, supra note
152 at paras 24-25.
280. Salna v Awad Alta CA, supra note 76 at para 28.
281. Limitations Act, SO 2002, c 24, Sch B, s 5(2). A presumption to this effect is found in
section 5(2) of Ontario’s Limitations Act which provides: “A person with a claim shall be
presumed to have known of the matters referred to in clause (1)(a) [discoverability of claim]
on the day the act or omission on which the claim is based took place, unless the contrary is
proved.” I thank Stephen Pitel for referring me to this source.
282. Trimble, supra note 271 at para 7.
283. Ibid at para 9, citing Novak, supra note 20 at para 81.
284. Trimble, supra note 277 at para 6 (quoting the familiar phrase of Côté JA in Hill v Alberta
Alta CA, supra note 48 at 336).
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know from having received legal advice—is a given, and is therefore not a
consideration to be applied.”285
D. BEYOND THE BLACKSTONIAN PARADIGM?

Courts across the common law world have on occasion averred that when
judges overrule prior precedent, or deliver clearly “new” law, their decisions
ought not to be shackled by the declaratory theory’s demand for retroactivity.286
This is not the place to critique the judiciousness of prospective overruling.287
It is sufficient to recognize that where the technique of prospective overruling is
employed, there will be no past “error” against which the limitation statute can
run. If novel court decisions operated only prospectively, and not retroactively,
it would not be a “mistake” to act in accordance with the law as understood
before the court’s judgment.288 Thus, in Goodswimmer v Canada, the Court of
Appeal of Alberta held that even if the impugned legislative provision at issue
did bear upon the plaintiffs’ case, policy considerations would militate against
extending limitation on past settled transactions by reference to a later judicial
declaration of unconstitutionality.289 It is only where a court accepts that there
has been a material past error of law that this article’s analysis of limitation on
such errors is pertinent.

V. CONCLUSION
Over the past three decades, Canadian common law has embraced a rule that
errors of law are irrelevant to the discoverability inquiry in the law of limitation.
285. Trimble, supra note 277 at para 13. See also the discussion in Quadrangle Holdings Ltd v
Coady, 2012 ABQB 22 paras 32-43.
286. Golak Nath v State of Punjab, 1967 AIR 1643 at 60, Subbarao CJ; Chevron Oil Co v Huson,
404 US 97 at 106-107 (1971); Murphy v Attorney General, [1982] IR 241 at 293-94,
O’Higgins CJ; Re Spectrum Plus Ltd, supra note 243 at para 34, Lord Nicholls; LCA 8925/04
Solel Boneh Building & Infrastructure Ltd v Estate of Alhamid [2006] (1) Isr LR 201 at paras
16-17, Barak P; Chamberlains v Lai, [2006] NZSC 70 at para 136, Tipping J; Hislop,
supra note 120 at para 93; Masiya v State (CCT54/06) [2007] ZACC 9 at para 51; Khan v
Bangladesh, ADC Vol IX (A), 10 (2012); Public Prosecutor v Hue An Li, [2014] SGHC 171 at
para 124, Sundaresh Menon CJ. Cf Ha v New South Wales (1997), 189 CLR 465 at 503-504;
HKSAR v Wa, [2006] 9 HKCFAR 614 at para 18, Li CJ.
287. See Beswick, “Retroactive Adjudication,” supra note 120.
288. Charles Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press,
2006) at 212-13.
289. Goodswimmer Alta CA, supra note 176 at para 92. See also Goodswimmer Alta QB, supra note
188 at paras 421-25.
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This rule is jurisprudentially shallow. It evokes the maligned fact/law distinction
and creates problems in doctrine and policy. It gives rise to the possibility that the
limitation clock will commence regardless of whether a plaintiff is reasonably able
to discover their error of law and pursue a claim in light of it. Certainly, this rule
is preferable to the recently-abandoned English approach, whereby the limitation
clock could remain paused up until an impugned point of law was authoritatively
determined by a final court. Canadian jurisprudence is right to eschew that path.
But the error-of-law exception is an overcorrection.
This article has argued that both approaches are misconceived. The
Canadian idea that juridical events are not a basis for postponing the running
of limitation periods is sound. But that idea should not be understood as an
exception to discoverability. It reflects, instead, the prima facie application of
the discoverability principle. This is the middle path: that errors of law are
presumptively discoverable when they are made.

VI. POSTSCRIPT
Shortly before this article went to print, the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom handed down judgment in Test Claimants in the Franked Investment
Income Group Litigation v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.290
A panel of seven Law Lords overruled the House of Lords’ landmark judgment
in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue,291 which interpreted
England’s discoverability rule to postpone the commencement of limitation
on claims in mistake of law “until the true state of the law is established by
a judicial decision from which there lies no right of appeal.”292 The Supreme
Court unanimously held that this interpretation contravened the text and
purpose of the limitation statute, was inconsistent with comparable precedents,
and produced paradoxical and illogical consequences that frustrated Parliament’s
intention for the statute.293 The Supreme Court did not, however, pivot to a
Canada-style interpretation. After careful consideration, a majority concluded
that England’s discoverability provision remains applicable to actions for relief
from the consequences of a mistake of law. Instead, they adopted an approach

290.
291.
292.
293.

FII Test Claimants v HMRC (SC), supra note 75.
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, supra note 75.
FII Test Claimants v HMRC (SC), supra note 75 at para 8.
Ibid at paras 174, 213.

Beswick, Error of Law 341

consistent with that advanced in Part IV of this article. The President and Deputy
President of the Supreme Court, delivering the joint lead opinion, concluded:294
That approach to the construction of the provision best gives effect to Parliament’s
intention to relieve claimants from the necessity of complying with a time limit
at a time when they cannot reasonably be expected to do so, and does not have
unacceptable consequences for the legal certainty which the 1980 [Limitation] Act
is primarily designed to protect.

The Supreme Court’s judgment is now—as the Law Lords themselves
implicitly recognised—one of “the most important decisions on the law of
limitation of recent times.”295 The Law Lords comprehensively grappled with
an issue that has received fleeting attention from Canadian courts to date. The
judgment provides further impetus for judges to reconsider the discoverability of
mistakes of law in Canada.

294. Ibid at para 243 (Lord Reed and Lord Hodge, joined by Lord Lloyd-Jones and
Lord Hamblen); cf ibid at para 258 (Lord Briggs and Lord Sales, joined by Lord
Carnwath, dissenting).
295. Ibid at para 1.

